



National Coordinator
for Counterterrorism

Ideology and Strategy of Jihadism



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Foreword

Counterterrorism is one of the most important themes in international and national security policy. The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) is responsible for developing the anti-terrorism policy, analysing intelligence and information, and directing security measures that must be taken in countering terrorism. The NCTb conducts analyses and makes products that are of importance to countering terrorism at the strategic level. One of these products is the Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands, a national report that is issued four times a year. The NCTb furthermore carries out studies such as the present, in which specific subjects are examined in more detail.

During the last decade, the largest terrorist threat has been caused by so-called 'Jihadist terrorism'. In recent times, and certainly since 11 September 2001, a wave of terrorist attacks has been carried out on the pretext of a religious armed fight, or holy war, the 'jihad'. In order to be able to cope with this threat both at present and in the long term, it is necessary to obtain an understanding of Jihadism.

With this study, I would like to increase the knowledge of Jihadism, in particular among the large group of professionals in executive organisations who are involved in counterterrorism, but also among politicians and other people in society. This study furthermore provides a basis for delegitimising this ideology, and formulating a substantive counter force for the Jihadist message. In order to develop a substantive counteroffensive and facilitate measures to combat a violent movement, knowledge of the ideological basis is, after all, indispensable.

This study gives a good picture of what Jihadists envisage and which strategy they intend to follow to realise this. The value can be found in the understanding of the way of thinking of the Jihadists, for the study has partly been based on authentic Arabic sources and publications of Jihadist ideologies, strategists, and groups.

In assessing Jihadism, there is a risk of exaggerating or, on the contrary, underestimating the dangers involved. The reader could get the impression, for instance, that the violent interpretation of the terms 'jihad' and 'Jihadism' is the only correct interpretation or has great public support among Muslims. Nothing is further from the truth; it only represents a small percentage. In addition, this study actually shows that an unequivocal interpretation of the concept of jihad does not exist. The emphasis in this study is, of course, on a radical, activist, and violent interpretation of jihad, for the object of this study was not to analyse Islam in all its manifestations. This could, however, give the unintended impression that Jihadism is the dominant perception of Islam. There is also a risk of underestimating the danger. Although it is only a small percentage of Muslims that adhere to Jihadism, Jihadism clearly does pose a worldwide threat. The key element of that ideology is, after all, the armed fight, which is characterised by terrorist activities. Muslims and non-Muslims have become victims of those terrorist activities all over the world.

With the present study, the NCTb does not give an opinion about religion in general or Islam in particular. In the circumstances where religion is abused by being used as a basis for a political ideology in order to attack the democratic rule of law, however, we must adopt a firm position: that this is unacceptable and will be combated with all legal means.

National Coordinator for Counterterrorism
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Preface

Jihadism in Context: The Islamic Landscape in the Netherlands

It is of great importance to ensure that a study into Jihadism is embedded in a description of the social and religious context in which it plays a role, and to view it in the light of the actual threat against the Netherlands or its interests abroad that emanates from this movement. As stated in the Foreword, reading this study without a description of that context may leave someone with the impression that Jihadism fulfils an important or even a leading function in the Islamic landscape in the Netherlands. This is not in the least the case. Below, a broad outline is given of the status of Islam in the Netherlands. The different movements are specified, and a description is given of how religious perception has changed in the course of time. Finally, attention is paid to Salafism and Jihadism, two movements that are quite small in the Netherlands, but which attract a great deal of public and political attention.

According to the most recent estimates of Statistics Netherlands, there are approximately 825,000 Muslims in the Netherlands; this is 5% of the total population. They are extremely varied as regards their ethnic background, the specific movement within Islam to which they adhere, and the perception of their faith. Within the scope of this study, it is possible to discuss the principal movements only briefly.¹ The two principal groups are the Sunnites, approximately 85% of the Muslims in the world, and the Shiites (particularly in Iran, Iraq, the Gulf States, and Pakistan). A third group consists of the Ahmadiyyah, a branch of the Sunni movement that originated in India, with approximately 10,000 adherents in the Netherlands. The majority of Muslims in the Netherlands belong to the Sunni movement. This movement may be subdivided into different denominations - all of which are present in the Netherlands - such as the adherents of the four great schools of law in Sunni Islam and the members of associations of mystics (Sufis). In addition, Sunni Islam has various religious political movements, which may be traced back to reformism in Islam that has its roots in Egypt at the beginning of the 20th century. Several of these movements are also present in the Netherlands. The Salafists are also counted among these movements, just like the Turkish Nurci movement, out of which the Gülen movement evolved. Shiite Islam also has submovements that are represented in the Netherlands. An extensive submovement is that of the Alevites, with - according to their federation - between 60,000 and 90,000 adherents, mainly Turks and Kurds.

The subdivision into ethnicity or movement is not the only division that can be made. The differences in the manner in which Dutch Muslims perceive their own religion and fit it in into their lives are perhaps even more important. In a recent publication, the religious sociologist Vellenga pointed out various trends within the Dutch Islamic communities, whereby in particular the trends of 'religious individualisation' and, among higher educated Muslims, 'secularisation' are taking root.² The former trend implies that traditional Islam is no longer adopted indiscriminately anymore, but that a personal interpretation is given to religious beliefs: this is nicely described by the term 'do it yourself'. The latter trend goes one step further and implies the diminishing influence of religious on personal life. There are also two other trends that occur to a lesser degree: 'coagulation', professing Islam as it was also professed in the country of origin, which is - logically - particularly seen in first-generation immigrants; and 'radicalisation', which has a religious and a political variant, and, in the latter case, a non-violent and a violent variant. The violent variant is exceptional in the Netherlands, and the study at hand deals with this exception.

¹ W.A.R. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld, *Islam in Nederland en België. Religieuze institutionalisering in twee landen met een gemeenschappelijke voor-geschiedenis (Islam in the Netherlands and Belgium. Religious institutionalisation in two countries with a common previous history)* (Leuven 2008), pp. 38-48.

² S. Vellenga, *Islam in Nederland: trends en toekomst (Islam in the Netherlands: trends and future)*, in: S. Vellenga et al. (ed.), *Mist in de polder. Zicht op ontwikkelingen omtrent Islam in Nederland (Mist in the polder. A view of the developments in Islam in the Netherlands)*, (Amsterdam 2009), pp. 13-30.

The trends of individualisation and secularisation have been observed for a longer period of time: also in *Muslim in the Netherlands (Moslim in Nederland)*, the study that was published by The Netherlands Institute for Social research/SCP in 2004. This study described the paradox created by - on the one hand - the growing identification of Turk and Moroccan Dutch nationals with Islam, and, on the other hand, an advancing secularisation, in the sense of a decrease in the practising of one's faith (attendance at mosque and following Islamic rules of life), which were occurring simultaneously.³ The 'islamisation of identity'⁴ is perhaps connected to the fact that foreign-born residents are increasingly more often referred to as 'Muslim' in the public debate and the media instead of 'Turk' or 'Moroccan', or more precisely as 'Turk Dutch national' and 'Moroccan Dutch national'. Jihadists also seek to replace a multiple identity by a single one. In their perception of the world, there are only Muslims and enemies of Muslims, in this case 'the West', 'the Crusaders', and 'the Jews'.

The changes in the perception of Islam are most notable in Islamic young people. In its annual monitor, Forum International - Institute for Multicultural Development describes the diverse and dynamic living environment of young people, a living environment in which tradition and modernity alternate with each other, sometimes with difficulty, and at other times smoothly.⁵ In his study of 2008, De Koning described the search of Moroccan Dutch Muslim young people for their identity and the manner in which they shape Islam in a Western environment. The division of their environment in matters which are 'haram' ('prohibited') and 'halal' ('permitted') is essential in this context. In order to be able to make this division, it is necessary to have knowledge of Islam. Many young people do not search for this knowledge in the tradition of their parents, but they seek a link with Islam as a worldwide religious movement ('umma'). The Salafist movements, that claim to profess the 'pure Islam' from the times of the Prophet Muhammad, may be rather appealing in this context. They offer a 'pure' Islam, shaped according to a model created in Saudi Arabia where Islam has its roots, with clear rules about what is permitted and what is prohibited. In addition, the Salafists provide a political idiom that can be used to condemn injustice against Muslims.⁶ Salafism makes the complex world comprehensible to these Muslim young people.

Is this what makes this movement dangerous? According to De Koning, many young people, in their search for a 'pure' Islam, end up in Salafist movements; 'movements' in plural, because we distinguish an apolitical, a political, and a jihadist variant. This is explained in more detail in Chapter 4. According to De Koning, these young people often have little knowledge of the Salafist doctrine, and identification with Salafism therefore does not mean that the young people have a leaning to violence or that they are antidemocratic. He consequently distinguishes a fourth Salafist movement, the so-called 'Salafist Shoppers'. These young people are not sound in their faith, but regard Salafism as a symbol that offers a critical perception of Dutch society and identification with the umma.⁷

3 K. Phalet and J. ter Wal (ed.), *Moslim in Nederland. Een onderzoek naar religieuze betrokkenheid van Turken en Marokkanen. Samenvatting (Muslim in the Netherlands. A study into religious involvement of Turks and Moroccans. Summary)* (The Hague 2004), pp. 39-45. For more information on the trend of secularisation, see: *Religie aan het begin van de 21ste eeuw (Religion at the beginning of the 21st century)*, CBS 2009.

4 The term as used by Vellenga.

5 *The mere titles of the studies speak volumes: Van Allah tot Prada (From Allah to Prada) (2006), Van vasten tot feesten (From Fasting to Feasting) (2007), Geloof en geluk (Faith and Fortune) (2008)*.

6 M. de Koning, *Zoeken naar een 'zuivere' islam. Geloofsbeleving en identiteitsvorming van jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims (In search of a 'pure Islam'. Perception of faith and formation of identity by young Moroccan Dutch Muslims)* (Amsterdam 2008) p. 305.

7 De Koning, *Zoeken naar een 'zuivere' islam (In search of a 'pure Islam')*, pp. 376-7.

De Koning's study, just like several other studies at the local level,⁸ have coloured the picture of the different submovements within Salafism further in the last few years. We currently have a better understanding of the motives of the adherents of Salafism and of the manner in which they fit the orthodox faith into their daily lives. This understanding is essential, because many Dutch people are worried about this movement, as is evident from the public and political debate. The Salafist doctrine is on strained terms with a tolerant, multiform, democratic society; which will be revealed by the follow-up of this study. In practice, most Muslims who seek to follow the Salafist method appear to be able to find an individual pragmatic balance between social participation and distant orthodoxy. The government does not fulfil a function in respect of orthodoxy in religious perception. This changes as soon as orthodoxy develops into the incitement to hatred, the improper use of a personal system of law, discrimination and intimidation of dissidents, the pursuit of an antidemocratic political agenda, and the use of undemocratic methods. This development is only observed in a relatively small group within the Salafist movement in the Netherlands. In addition, the growth of Salafism has come to a standstill, as revealed by a recent analysis of the General Intelligence and Security Service. Another trend that has been observed is the increased assertiveness of Muslims against extremist violence. This is both a global trend⁹ and a national trend.¹⁰ Former Jihadist ideologists, such as Sayyid Imam Sharif, have retracted the doctrine of violence they used to preach. Their refutation is a powerful answer to the ideologists of the jihad.

An even smaller group within Salafism (and other Islamic movements) is radicalising into Jihadism. This proved to be a real danger in the past - as became evident from the actions of the members of the Hofstadgroep - and will be prevented and countered with all available means. The General Intelligence and Security Service and the Police continue to monitor persons who have been active in Jihadist networks. The current threat that emanates from these networks is low. They currently do not have the intention to commit attacks in the Netherlands. This is mainly due to an ongoing lack of leadership and cohesion within the relevant networks, a decrease in task orientation (fewer activities are performed that are connected with the violent jihad), and successful government policy. The local internationally-oriented networks, which mainly aim at facilitating the jihad in the classical jihad areas, do not currently have the intention to commit attacks in the Netherlands either. We do observe the interest of young people, however, at a limited scale, to participate in the fight in Jihadist battle fields in other parts of the world.¹¹

Vigilance is, however, called for. Jihadism still appeals to some Dutch people. The Jihadist message continues to be powerfully seductive to some people. The effect of international events, ongoing polarisation in our own country, or the rise of a charismatic leader could easily cause these people to think that it is time for action. To fight Jihadists it is necessary to fathom their ideology and strategy. This is what the follow-up of this study is concerned with.

⁸ In 2009, in particular: H. Moors and M. Jacobs, *Aan de hand van de imam. Integratie en participatie van orthodoxe moslims in Tilburg-Noord (Led by the imam. Integration and participation of orthodox Muslims in North Tilburg)* (Tilburg 2009), and L. Balogh et al., *Eigenheid of eigenzinnigheid. Analyse van cultuur- en geloofsgerelateerde denkbepelden en gedragsuitingen in de gemeente Ede, (Individuality and Self-will. Analysis of culture and religion-related perceptions and behavioural expressions in the Municipality of Ede)* (Tilburg 2009).

⁹ J.L. Esposito and D. Mogahed, 'Who speaks for Islam? What a billion Muslims really think' (New York, 2007).

¹⁰ Illustrated in: J. Groen and A. Kranenberg, 'Opstand der gematigden. De groeiende weerbaarheid van Nederlandse moslims' (*Revolt of the moderate. The growing assertiveness of Dutch Muslims*), (Amsterdam 2009).

¹¹ See: *Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands*, no. 18 (September 2009).

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Summary

Cause and purpose

The Jihadist movement¹ is the driving force behind the current worldwide terrorist wave that is carried out on the pretext of a religious armed fight, the 'jihad'. This movement derives its strength largely from its ideology. There is increasing consensus that Jihadism should be combated not only by repressing it, in the form of a war against terrorism or by means of intelligence organisations and police, but rather by also addressing it specifically at the level of ideology. The knowledge of Jihadist ideology is, however, still limited. This study aims to provide insight into this ideology, the strategy derived from it, and the method of production, reproduction, and propagation of this ideology and strategy, in order to improve the capability to counter Jihadist terrorism.

Conclusions

The conclusions of this study are the following:

1. Jihad in Islam is a concept with a peaceful and spiritual meaning as well as a violent meaning; which allows more than one interpretation, and which has been developed in numerous ways which have - in part - come about in a variety of situations. A single religiously authorised view on the concept is lacking.
2. Jihadism stems from the need for social and political change in Muslim countries, and from the attack on Islam and (former) Islamic territory as perceived by Jihadists. Jihadism arose primarily after 1979 in and as a result of various scenes of war, and has since then spread all over the world.
3. Sayyid Qutb's Salafist doctrines and ideas constitute the foundations of present-day Jihadist ideology and strategy. Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Abdullah Azzam, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdissi, Abu Musab as-Suri, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, and Osama Bin Laden have also had a prominent influence on or role in its development. They declared that the armed fight, or war, (jihad) was lawful in an increasing number of circumstances, for more and more goals, and against an increasing number of opponents, and elevated the armed fight, or war, to the status of an individual duty for each Muslim.
4. Within Jihadism, the concept of jihad has become a byword for armed fight, also referred to as 'holy war'. Jihadists themselves also regard war, a guerrilla war, terrorism, and sometimes also individual unrelated criminal actions as the armed fight.
5. The ultimate goal of Jihadists is the End Time, which is preceded by the worldwide rule of Islam and the re-establishment of the Islamic State. The jihad is the only and appropriate means to achieve the goals, just as the dawah and Hijra² in preparation for and in the context of the jihad. The concept of jihad as a means and that which Jihadists oppose have been developed much more than the goals.
6. The concepts and theoretical notions of the Jihadist ideology have been developed on numerous points and made operational in strategic concepts and notions, particularly in respect of jihad as a means and that which Jihadists oppose. These concepts and notions are constantly adapted to new circumstances. In particular, the perceived attack on Islam and the 'Islamic territory' by 'Jews and Crusaders' is an essential theme.
7. The Jihadist ideology and strategy are produced, reproduced, and propagated by various producers, through various institutions and in a variety of manners.

1 Jihadist movement: All the networks, groups, cells, and individuals striving - by means of an armed fight or war (jihad) - to bring about worldwide rule of Islam and the re-establishment of the Islamic State (Caliphate), on the basis of a specific interpretation of the Salafist doctrine and on the basis of Sayyid Qutb's ideas.

2 Hijra means migration from a country and flight to another country for religious or political reasons, but also a temporary or permanent settlement in the country to which Muslims have fled.

Jihad in islam

There is no univocal answer to the question about the meaning of the concept of jihad in Islam. A first reason is that the concept has both a peaceful and spiritual meaning, and a violent meaning, namely the armed fight, or war.

A second reason is that the concept of jihad can be interpreted in many ways. Jihad, in the meaning of armed fight, originates from the Quran. Its meaning was further developed in the traditions of the Prophet (hereinafter called Tradition), Islamic warfare literature, and Islamic Law. The verses on the jihad in the Quran, just like the elements of the Tradition, can be interpreted in many ways and depend on the context. Not all elements of the Tradition of the Prophet are accepted by all Muslims. Besides, there is a variety of Islamic schools of law and among and within these schools of law there are differing opinions.

A third reason is that the armed fight was developed further from a variety of overlapping perspectives. There is a distinction between a defensive jihad and an offensive jihad. The defensive jihad is aimed at protecting the religion, the religious community, the Islamic State or the Islamic territory. The offensive jihad is aimed at propagating Islam among unbelievers. There is another distinction between Islamic territory - the 'House of Islam' - and non-Islamic territory - the 'House of War' or the 'House of Treaty'. A third distinction concerns the types of enemies to be distinguished. The fight must be waged against believers who believe in several gods (e.g. Hindus and Buddhists), believers who believe in one God (Jews and Crusaders), unbelievers, and disloyal Muslims. The conditions for the armed fight have also been specified. Muslims who fight may not commit any violation and are to react in proportion. In addition, they must wage a fight under the leadership of a legitimate person in authority, the leader of the religious community.

A fourth reason for the difficulty in defining the concept of Jihad is that the development of this concept was partly determined by situation. The nature, scope and means of the jihad have developed since the days of the Prophet. The first period in Mecca was mainly dominated by the striving for freedom of religion and freedom of propagating the religion. With the Prophet's migration to Medina, the jihad became gradually more dominated by the concept of defending the religion and the religious community which had arisen. Even later still, the jihad was dominated by the expansion of the religious community, and in the twentieth century it was dominated by the call for social and political changes. As a result of the fact that the development of the concept of jihad was dominated by many different situations, a variety of interpretations of the concept have arisen.

Finally, it must be noted that there is not one authorised interpretation of jihad in Islam, for *the* (one) religion of *Islam* does not exist. There is a division between Sunnis and Shiites. There are many schools of law and branches within (political) Islam. Muslims live under diverse circumstances and have many ethnicities. As a result, Islam and the Muslims in the 21st century do not constitute a homogenous block. Besides, there is no *single* authority to authorise religious viewpoints. Nobody can therefore claim to have a monopoly on *the* interpretation of *the* jihad in *the* religion of *Islam*.

Historical context of Jihadism

The foundation for Jihadism was laid before 1979, mainly in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The political Islam

that arose at the time was a reaction to major social changes and problems in Muslim countries, and developed from the need for social and political changes in Muslim countries. Jihadism is an extreme, activist and violent variant of political Islam, and feels the same need.

The year 1979 may be regarded as the turning point in the development of Jihadism. This year was marked by three events, namely the Islamic revolution in Iran, the occupation of the holy mosque in Mecca, and the invasion of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Each of these events led - separately and in conjunction - to a situation where Jihadists began using Islam to legitimise a political and armed fight on the pretext of jihad. From 1979 onwards, Jihadists placed the armed fight more and more in the perspective of the attack of 'Jews and Crusaders' on Islam and - former - Islamic territory. They also focused the armed fight, whether or not in conjunction with this development, on regimes in Muslim countries which - in the eyes of Jihadists - were disloyal regimes

Several conflicts have been highly significant for the forming of the Jihadist ideology and strategy.

The conflicts referred to here are :

- a the war in Afghanistan (1979 - 2001);
- b the first Gulf War (1990 - 1991);
- c the fights in centres of conflict such as Algeria, Bosnia, and Chechnya (from 1990);
- d the attacks in the US (2001);
- e the subsequent fights in Afghanistan, and
- f Iraq.

A kind of 'cross-pollination' took place among views, concepts, and strategies among numerous branches and ideologies, strategists, and leaders. The result of this, a new concept of jihad, was tested and tailored on the jihad battlefield. The experiences and insights gained then served as a basis for the further development of the ideology and strategy. Thinking and acting reinforced each other in this way.

Branches, ideologies, and strategies

The Salafist doctrines and the ideas of Sayyid Qutb, and ideological founder of the Muslim Brothers, form the foundations for the Jihadist ideology and strategy. Salafists and Muslim Brothers mainly focus on dawah and political reforms as a means to realise the desired changes. Jihadists, on the other hand, mainly focus on the armed fight. Within the Jihadist movement, the following branches can be distinguished: the Jordanian, Palestinian, and Syrian branch, the Egyptian branch, the Saudi branch, and the European branch.

The following persons played or still play a prominent part in the development of the Jihadist ideology and strategy: Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989), Abu Muhammad al-Maqdissi (1959-), Abu Musab as-Suri (1958-), Ayman al-Zawahiri (1951-), Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (1950-), and Osama Bin Laden (1957-).

The above-mentioned branches and persons contributed mainly to theoretical comprehension as well as reinterpretation of the traditional concept of jihad as a reinterpretation in the light of the political situation in various Muslim countries and the international relationships from 1979 onwards. The armed fight was considered lawful in an increasing number of circumstances, for more and more goals, and against an increasing number of opponents. In addition, the armed fight was elevated to the status of an individual duty for all Muslims. Numerous restrictions were disregarded.

Jihadist ideology

The Jihadist ideology consists of a mix of theological, dogmatic, liturgical, ethic, legal, and political concepts or doctrines that are closely connected. They can be arranged as follows:

1. The Oneness of God [*Tawhid*];
2. Belief and disbelief [*Iman and Kufr*];
3. Worship of God [*Ibada*];
4. The duty to apply divine laws and regulations [*al-Hukm bi-ma Anzala Allah*];
5. Loyalty and Enmity [*al-Walaa wal-Baraa*];
6. The society of Muslims [*Jama'at al-Muslimin*];
7. Preaching and missionary work [*ad-Dawah*];
8. The armed fight [*al-Jihad*];
9. Re-establishment of the Islamic State (Caliphate).

The first eight concepts correspond to the central concepts of Salafism. Jihad, in the meaning of armed fight, ensues from all central concepts/doctrines, both in Salafism and in Jihadism. Jihadism, however, has construed these concepts in an extreme and activist way, and has attached activist consequences to them. In addition, Jihadism has increased and expanded the circumstances in which jihad may or must be waged, and has disregarded restrictions.

The activist nature and the use of violence to realise changes are important characteristics of Jihadism. The concept of jihad has consequently become a byword for armed fight, also referred to as 'holy war'. Jihadists themselves also regard war, a guerrilla war, terrorism, and sometimes also individual unrelated criminal actions as the armed fight. In this context, it concerns an armed fight fought by individuals, groups, and freedom fighters, and not by countries. The themes ensuing from the central concepts are dualistic: opposition against something, for instance, 'rejection of separation of Church and State', and commitment to something, for instance, 'structure of a theocratic political system'. Jihadism does not - by any means - always have the monopoly on these themes. There are more branches in Islam that, for instance, strive for the implementation of Islamic Law (Sharia). As a result of its activist nature, the themes Jihadism *opposes* are often developed much further than the themes to which Jihadism *commits* itself.

Jihadism has four principal themes, namely the End Time, the worldwide rule of Islam, the re-establishment of the Islamic State, and, finally, dawah and jihad by the vanguard as a means to achieve these goals. The End Time, which means the end of the world and the subsequent 'Judgment Day', is the ultimate goal. Previous to this, Jihadism strives to bring about the worldwide rule of Islam and the re-establishment of the Islamic State. Dawah and jihad by the vanguard, read Jihadists, are the only and appropriate means. Dawah must be subordinate to jihad; Hijra, by analogy with the Prophet Muhammad's migration from Mecca to Medina, is a link between dawah and jihad. Jihadists reject everything that conflicts with those ideals. Jihadism is not a closed and monolithic system, but it is characterised by a high degree of sturdiness. Jihadism also has 'romantic' and mystical characteristics.

Jihadist strategy

The Jihadist ideology has been developed on numerous points and made operational in strategic concepts and notions.

1. Jihadists define the international relationships and conflicts in religious terms. There is a continuous and permanent conflict between belief and unbelief, or between 'pure and rightful Muslims' and others. There is an offensive going on, a new crusade by Jews and Crusaders under the command of the US against Islam and the Islamic territory.
2. Jihadists consider the formation of Islamic mini-states an important step towards the Caliphate. In the current situation, Jihadists unilaterally proclaimed Islamic states in Iraq, the Caucasus, and Afghanistan.
3. The Jihadist movement currently has different leaders: the leaders of the armed fight - locally, regionally, and worldwide - and the leaders of the Islamic states in Afghanistan, the Caucasus, and Iraq. Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are considered leaders of the worldwide armed fight, but also as leaders of the religious community.
4. The strategy is aimed at restoration of the traditional Islamic institutions, such as the mosque, but then in accordance with the Jihadist interpretation. The strategy is furthermore aimed at structuring the Jihadists' own institutions.
5. The preparations for the use of violence form an essential part of the 'peaceful' strategies of Jihadists in the form of dawah.
6. The emphasis in strategic thinking has mainly been put on waging war. Direct military confrontation is preferred, but is not considered expedient and advantageous due to the military preponderance of the enemies. Forms of waging war that are considered more suitable are a guerrilla war and terrorism.
7. There are different views about the question on which scale the armed fight must be waged, namely a fight aimed at combating disloyal regimes in one's own country (close enemy) or the US and its allies (distant enemy), or a worldwide fight against all unbelievers.
8. There is a distinction in the view of the manner of waging this armed fight: either by deploying an Islamic army or resistance brigades, or in an anarchistic manner, or individually.

The strategic concepts and notions have been adjusted time and time again to new circumstances. In respect of the strategy it also applies that the means of jihad and that which Jihadists oppose has been developed further than the goals the Jihadists finally want to achieve.

Jihadists consider the method in which the Prophet Muhammad and the four Caliphs established the original religious community and propagated Islam an important source of inspiration for realising their own ideals. There are various interpretations of that method. According to one of those interpretations, the creation of the community of Muslims and the propagation of Islam lasted a total of 23 years. A step-by-step plan drafted by a presumptive key member of al-Qaeda contains seven steps. The preparation for the armed fight would allegedly have begun in 2000 and after a global confrontation, which will end around 2020, the final victory will have been gained and various omens of the End Time will have become visible.

Method of production, reproduction, and propagation

The Jihadist ideology and strategy is produced, reproduced, and propagated by leaders of the jihad, spiritual scholars and junior scholars, preachers, strategists and analysts, translators, and jihad fighters in the field. The production, reproduction, and propagation is effected through various institutions, including so-called 'Legal Islamic authorities', media committees, virtual institutions and websites, mainstream media, mosques, and educational and socio-cultural institutions.

1 Introduction

1.1 Cause

In recent times, and certainly since 11 September 2001, a wave of terrorist attacks has been carried out on the pretext of a religious armed fight, or holy war, the *'jihad'*. Although the concept of jihad in Islam is much broader than armed fight, or war, it is usual to refer to *'Jihadist terrorism'* in this context.¹

The individuals, groups, and networks adhering to, propagating, or taking the responsibility for this form of terrorism are referred to as *'Jihadists'*; together they form the *'Jihadist movement'*.

The Jihadist movement derives its strength largely from its ideology. This certainly applies to al-Qaeda. Those involved in countering terrorism therefore consider al-Qaeda to an increasing extent as an ideology instead of an organisation. There is increasing consensus that Jihadism must be combated not only by repressing it, in the form of a 'war against terrorism' or by means of intelligence organisations and police, but rather by also addressing it specifically at the level of ideology.

The knowledge of Jihadist ideology is, however, still limited. This publication aims to provide an insight into this ideology. An understanding of the ideology alone is however insufficient, for the ideology has been translated into a strategy and has been propagated as well as produced and reproduced through numerous institutions and in numerous ways.

1.2 Purpose, Research Questions, and Delineation

The purpose of this publication is to provide insight into this ideology, the strategy derived from it, and the methods of production, reproduction, and propagation, in order to more effectively counter Jihadist terrorism. The research questions are as follows:

1. What is the meaning of the concept of jihad in Islam?
2. How have the Jihadist ideology and strategy developed, in particular since 1979, and which events had a substantial effect on this?
3. Which branches, ideologists, and strategists form the basis of the Jihadist ideology and strategy, and what were their major contributions?
4. What are the central concepts and themes of the Jihadist ideology, how do they interrelate, and which characteristics does the ideology have?
5. To what extent and in what way has the Jihadist ideology been developed in a strategy?
6. By what methods have the Jihadist ideology and strategy been produced, reproduced and propagated?

This publication is in part based on French, English, and Dutch secondary literature on Jihadists.

In addition, sources and publications of Jihadist groups primarily in the Arabian language and obtained through extremist websites in the Arabian language were examined, as well as publications by Jihadist spiritual and political leaders, fatwas of Jihadist clerics and publications of Jihadist groups.

¹ In some circles, people object to the use of the combination of jihad and terrorism. In the practice of counter-terrorism, however, the concepts of Jihadist terrorism, Jihadism and such like have become generally adopted and accepted terms, which are not easily replaced by other less emotionally charged terms. Moreover, the ideologists, strategists, and fighters themselves choose to refer to themselves as Jihadists.

1.3 Jihadism, Jihadist Movement, and Jihadist Terrorism

1.3.1 Jihadism as a branch within political Islam

During the last decade, Islam has become an increasingly more important political factor in Muslim countries. Numerous political parties and movements have derived their goals and activities from Islam. In this context, Islam is also referred to as ‘political Islam’ or ‘Islamism’. Islamism may be of a Sunnite or Shiite nature.² Salafism and Jihadism, two branches within Islamism, are Sunnite, just like the movements of the Muslim Brothers, the Hizb-u Tahrir (HuT)³, and Hamas. Hezbollah is a Shiite movement.

Islamism can, among other things, be distinguished by the methods in which changes are pursued: violently or non-violently. Characteristic of the non-violent branch is that it does not use or advocate violence for realising the envisaged changes. Jihadism falls under the scope of ‘violent Islamism’.

1.3.2 Position of Jihadism in relation to other ideologies

Jihadism is composed of extremist and violent elements, which are, in particular, related to the Salafist doctrine (see section 4.2) and the ideas of Sayyid Qutb, the most important ideologist of the Muslim Brothers (see section 4.3). Although several influential authors consider Jihadism part of Salafism, Jihadism definitely has its own ideology. It has developed in the course of time and it is still being developed. In addition, Jihadism gives a violent and activist interpretation of the eight central concepts of Salafism. Jihadism also extends the circumstances under which the jihad is permitted, and disregards numerous restrictions.

1.3.3 Definition of Jihadism

In this publication, the concept of Jihadism is defined as follows:

Jihadism is a branch within political Islam that is striving - by means of an armed fight, or war (jihad) - to bring about the worldwide rule of Islam and the re-establishment of the Islamic State (Caliphate), on the basis of a specific interpretation of the Salafist doctrine and on the basis of Sayyid Qutb's ideas.

In this publication, Jihadism is mainly used to refer to the branch and as a collective term for ‘Jihadist ideology and strategy’.

Jihadism considers the armed fight, or war, which is defined as jihad, as the very means to realise its ideals. The term ‘Jihadism’, just as that of ‘Jihadist’, has consequently been derived from the concept of ‘jihad’. The concept of ‘jihad’ in Islam is, however, a complex and comprehensive concept that also has an explicitly spiritual and ‘peaceful’ meaning (see chapter 2). When reference is made to Jihadism or Jihadist, this is always a reference to jihad in the meaning of an armed fight, also referred to as ‘small jihad’ or by some as ‘holy war’. This is the jihad waged by individuals, groups, and freedom fighters, and not by countries.

The armed fight, or war (jihad), may take different forms. In the Quran, this form of jihad is also referred to as ‘Qital’, meaning ‘(deathly) fight’, ‘Harb’, meaning ‘war’, or ‘Ghazw’ referring to an expedition or an attack. Jihadists themselves distinguish three elements that fall under the concept of jihad: war, guerilla warfare, and terrorism. The Jihadist concept of armed fight, or war, may therefore include a wide range

² Sunnite and Shiite are the two main branches within Islam (see the glossary).

³ De HuT is a political-activist group that operates all over the world. Its ideology is aimed at establishing or re-establishing a caliphate state, led in accordance with the rules of the Sharia.

of violent activities. Examples of this are the war against Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the period between 1979 and 1989; the bloody civil war in Algeria after 1992; the current fight involving the Taliban in Afghanistan; and the fight against the US and coalition troops in Iraq. The large-scale attacks of 11 September 2001 in the US and the small-scale terrorist actions of individuals and groups all over the world are also covered by the concept of armed fight, or war.

Jihadism strives for the worldwide rule of Islam and the re-establishment of the Islamic State. The basic principle for this is the Jihadist interpretation of the model of the religious community of the Prophet (see section 5.2).

1.3.4 Definition of the Jihadist movement

The concept of 'Jihadist movement' is defined as follows:

The Jihadist movement includes all the networks, groups, cells and individuals which are striving - by means of an armed fight, or war (jihad) - to bring about the worldwide rule of Islam and the re-establishment of the Islamic State (Caliphate) on the basis of a specific interpretation of the Salafist doctrine and on the basis of Sayyid Qutb's ideas.

In the concept of 'Jihadists' the emphasis is on the actors who participate in the Jihadist movement; in the concept of 'Jihadist movement' the emphasis is on the collectivity of those actors.

The element of 'movement' may be specified as all the networks, groups, cells, and individuals with similar views and goals, with the caveat that there is no question of homogeneous unity. Within the Jihadist movement there are differing opinions about specific subjects, and there are other differences. There is also no central direction or authority. It is still possible, however, to refer to a movement with the ideology as binding factor. A comparison can be made with the communist movement, within which there were also differing opinions, branches, and so on, and which did not have one worldwide direction and authority. Al-Qaeda plays a key role within the Jihadist movement. In this connection, a distinction is made among 'the core of al-Qaeda', 'al-Qaeda allies', and 'al-Qaeda adherents' (see the glossary).

Hamas, inspired by the Sunnite Muslim Brothers, and Hezbollah, inspired by Shiism, are not part of the Jihadist movement.⁴ These two organisations explicitly dissociate themselves from Salafism and Jihadism. Hamas and the Lebanese Hezbollah are mainly focused on liberating Palestine and destroying Israel, whereas the Jihadist movement pursues a broader range of goals. It is true that they also use the concept of jihad for their fight, but they do not consider themselves Jihadists and they are opposed to them. Jihadists, in their turn, do not agree with the - in their view - moderate course pursued by Hamas. Jihadists, who are Sunnite, are also opposed to Hezbollah because of the Shiite nature of this movement.

1.3.5 Definition of Jihadist terrorism

The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism has defined terrorism as follows:

Terrorism is threatening to commit, making preparations for or perpetrating, for ideological reasons, acts of serious violence directed at people or other acts intended to cause property damage with the aim of disrupting society, for the purpose of bringing about social change, creating a climate of fear among the general public, or influencing political decision-making.

⁴ Please refer to the glossary for the difference between Sunnites and Shiites.

On the basis of a combination of the definitions of Jihadism and terrorism, Jihadist terrorism may be defined as follows:

Jihadist terrorism is terrorism from a Jihadist point of view. This category of terrorism is characterised by:

- *Labelling as jihad the activities of threatening to commit, making preparations for, or perpetrating acts of serious violence directed at people or other acts intended to cause property damage with the aim of disrupting society;*
- *The carrying out of activities that fit in with the efforts of striving to bring about the worldwide rule of Islam and the re-establishment of the Islamic State.*

It should be noted that the armed fight, or war, in the context of Jihadism is broader than only performing terrorist activities (see above). It should also be noted that these activities include activities that fit in with the above-mentioned goals. It is true that the murder of Theo van Gogh by Muhammad B. was directed primarily at killing a person who - allegedly - had insulted the Prophet, but it was in line with the broader context of the perceived attack on Islam. This murder is therefore categorised under the above-mentioned definition of Jihadist terrorism.

1.4. Reader's guide

The six research questions are discussed in separate chapters. The Jihadist movement defines its fight as 'jihad' and in doing so it relies on Islam. To be able to gain a clear understanding of the Jihadist ideology, is it therefore important to examine the meaning of jihad in Islam further; this is done in chapter 2. The Jihadist ideology and strategy are the result of a long maturing process, but they have developed strongly since 1979 in particular. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the manner in which this happened. Against this historical background, it is possible to distinguish several branches, ideologists, and strategists as founders. Chapter 4 gives a description of these branches, ideologists, and strategists, and of their most important contributions. Chapter 5 provides an explanation of the core concepts and themes of Jihadist ideology. This chapter gives a description of how these concepts and themes interrelate and of the characteristics of each of them. Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the Jihadist strategy. The method used to produce, reproduce and propagate the Jihadist ideology is discussed in chapter 7. The publication concludes with some final observations, in chapter 8.

2 Jihad in Islam

2.1 Jihad in the Quran

The Quran includes the revelations that the Prophet Muhammad received from God. The Prophet Muhammad was born around the year 570 in Mecca, a city on the Arabian Peninsula. In those days, this peninsula was dominated by tribes and clans. It was not only the scene of tribal warfare, but also the place where an international struggle for power was being fought between the Christian Byzantine Empire and the Persian Empire.

According to the Tradition, the Prophet received his first revelation in the year 610. The more the Prophet's group of adherents increased, the more the opposition against him increased. In 622 the Prophet eventually left for Medina. This migration from Mecca to Medina [*Hijra*] is the beginning of the Islamic era. In Medina, he was free to propagate his message and increase his group of adherents. He created a community that was based on the faith: the 'religious community' [*Umma*]. Apart from being a prophet, Muhammad was also a legislator and a judge, as well as a political and military leader in Medina. In the period of ten years that he lived in Medina, the Prophet waged many battles, including battles against attacks originating from Mecca. He also led expeditions against unbelievers. The Prophet died in 632.

The Prophet Muhammad had not left behind any writings, in the Tradition, in which his succession was arranged, nor had he appointed a successor. As a result of this, his adherents had to appoint the Prophet's successor [*Caliph*]. The first caliph was Abu Bakr (632-634). The second caliph was Omar (634-644). Omar's successor was Uthman (644-656). Uthman strived mainly for political and religious unity. There was much unrest during the last years of his rule. The unrest reached its highest point in 656, when dissatisfied Muslims from Iraq and Egypt, assisted by Muslims from Medina, killed Uthman. After the fourth caliph Ali (656-661), a fight arose over who was to be his successor. This finally resulted in a split in the Muslim community between the Sunnites and Shiites. This split has prevailed to date. A majority of the Muslims refer to the first four caliphs, who ruled after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, as the 'four rightful caliphs'.

Muslims consider God as the author of the Quran and Muhammad as the Prophet and Messenger of God. The Quran consists of 114 Suras or chapters. Each chapter deals with a large number of themes and subjects, but does not always constitute a homogenous unity. A Sura consists of several verses, with the number of verses in each Sura varying from 3 to 286. The verses are more or less arranged by length, except in the first Sura. They are consequently not arranged in chronological order. The short Suras mainly originate from the Prophet's first period; the longer verses from his last period. The verses on jihad in the Quran were revealed in a variety of circumstances, within various junctures and contexts, without these Suras always being clear. Previous verses were not 'withdrawn' and the importance of verses may vary. The verses were revealed and written down in the juncture of many centuries ago when there was still a tribal system and the tribes were almost permanently involved in tribal warfare. The Quran is considered difficult to read, partly because of its flowery language.

The concept of jihad occurs in a variety of meanings in various verses in different Suras of the Quran. The basic meaning of the term '*jihad*' in the Quran is 'a struggle for a worthy cause.' It first of all has an ethical meaning: human beings have the divinely ordained duty to struggle against the evil in oneself. A second meaning is the struggle in the interest of Islam and the religious community. The Jihad in these two meanings is also referred to as the 'great jihad' and is peaceful by nature. A third meaning is that of armed

fight. This is the 'small jihad', also referred to as 'jihad with the sword' and sometimes as 'holy war'. The Quran also uses other terms to refer to this form of jihad. The first term is 'Qital', meaning '(deathly) fight'; the second term is 'Harb', meaning 'war'; and the third term is 'Ghazw', referring to an expedition or an attack.

The number of verses in the Quran on jihad and the number of verses on armed fight, or war, cannot be determined unequivocally, and depends on the criteria used. This publication explicitly uses the terms 'Qital', 'Harb', or 'Ghazw' as a criterion, or any other terms that explicitly refer to the use of violence in the original Arabian text. Appendix 1 lists the relevant verses on armed fight, or war. In this context, it should be noted that Jihadists misinterpret many verses on jihad as being a verse on armed fight, or war. A random example of this can be found in the first four verses of Sura 60 (The Woman tested). These original verses in Arabic refer to enemies, hatred, and jihad, but explicitly do not refer to the use of violence. Another random example can be found in the verses 73 up to and including 75 of Sura 8 (The Spoils). In these verses, reference is made to the offerings to be made by Muslims for their faith (migration, money, personal sacrifices). In these verses, too, no explicit reference is made to the use of violence or the armed fight.¹

It is important - in particular for the interpretation of the concept of jihad - to distinguish between the Mecca period and the Medina period of the Prophet. To Muslims, the first period was mainly dominated by the striving for freedom of religion and freedom of propagating the faith. When preaching his faith in this period, the Prophet did not make an appeal to violence and war, but put the emphasis on the great jihad. His migration to Medina marked the beginning of a new situation. He established a religious community, in surroundings where Jewish tribes and Christians lived, and became its leader. In addition, the Prophet was confronted with enemies and he lived in a time of almost continuous tribal warfare. The jihad was placed more and more in the context of defending the faith and the religious community, and power.

The contents of the verses on armed fight can be divided into several themes. A first theme is the motive for the armed fight, or war. In the Quran, the armed fight, or war, is primarily a fight to protect the faith and the religious community. Later on it was revealed that the religious community had to wage the armed fight, or war, to propagate the faith among unbelievers. A second theme is formed by the circumstances in which an armed fight, or war, may or must be waged. One of the verses, for instance, prescribes that waging a fight, or war, during the 'four holy months' and close to the holy mosque in Mecca is subject to restrictions. The third theme concerns a more specific elaboration of those at whom the armed fight, or war, may be directed, namely at the Jews and the Christians (the monotheistic religions), unbelievers, and Muslims who no longer live in accordance with the laws of Islam or who renounced their faith. In the first instance, Muslims are prompted to be patient with the monotheistic religions. As soon as the Jews and Christians accept the political authority of Muslims and consequently acquire the status of protégé [*Dhimmi*] and pay the personal tax, also referred to as the tribute [*Jizya*], the armed fight, or war, may no longer be waged against them. In that case, the Jews and Christians will retain their religious community autonomy. This exception does not apply to the other religions, such as Buddhism. Adherents of these other religions

¹ There may be differences between verse numbers due to different printed editions of the Quran (see appendix Verses from the Quran that explicitly refers to armed fight).

must convert to Islam without delay. A fourth theme relates to the ethics and the rules of the armed fight, or war. There is, for instance, an exhortation not to commit any offences, a call for proportionality, and attention for the fate of prisoners of war. A fifth theme, finally, relates to a call to, and encouragement for participation in, the armed fight, or war, and the promise of rewards to those who die during the jihad and punishment of those who do not participate.

2.2 Jihad in the Tradition

The *Hadith* contains the Tradition of the Prophet Muhammad. The Tradition is a collection of thousands of short and long narratives with examples relating to what the Prophet did, said, or approved. These narratives were usually passed down orally by contemporaries. It was only a century and a half later that hadiths were written down on a large scale. There were also twisted and forged hadiths in circulation. It can be deduced from the Hadith what the Prophet's *Sunnah*, or custom, was. The Sunnah was thus passed down to descendants through the narratives of the Hadith, and the Prophet's Sunnah is evident from the context and his statements. In this publication, the term 'Tradition' is used to refer to 'according to the Tradition or custom of the Prophet' instead of Hadith and Sunnah. The Tradition confirms the rules of the Quran, and gives depth to some ideas, rules, and practical issues mentioned in the Quran. In addition, the Tradition includes rules that are not regulated in the Quran.

In the Tradition, we also see, once again, the distinction between the great jihad and the small jihad. The Tradition repeats the above-mentioned themes from the Quran on the jihad and elaborates on these themes. As regards mobilisation, the Prophet Muhammad put much emphasis on the virtues of the armed fight, or war. These involve the personal, moral qualifications and the merits of the jihad fighter, both in this world and the hereafter. Martyrdom is also given more emphasis. The jihad is portrayed as a worthy goal for every Muslim. Martyrdom is made attractive by the many virtues and awards attached to it. Another important aspect that is developed further is the intention of the jihad fighter. The believer is judged on his intentions. One of the statements of the Prophet is that intention is just as important as the deed or action itself. A theme that does not occur in the Quran, but does occur in the Tradition, relates to the operational aspects of waging the armed fight, or war, namely the conduct of war, the authority, and the leadership of the fight.

2.3 Jihad in Islamic Law and warfare literature

In Islam, the rules and regulations about how the believers must act and how they must behave occupy an important place. The system of rules, laws, and regulations is called 'Islamic Law' [*Sharia*]. In this connection, many Islamic movements, including the Muslim Brothers and the HuT, prefer to use the term 'Application of the Sharia' [*Tatbiq ash-Sharia*], whereas Salafists and Jihadists rather use the term 'Application of the Divine laws and regulations' [*al-Hukm bi-ma Anzala Allah*]. In this publication, the term 'Islamic Law' is used as much as possible instead of Sharia.

Many discussions were held on the details of Islamic Law, but the parties did by no means always agree. Characteristic of Islam is that a problem was solved by the parties slowly but surely recognising each others current system or schools of law. These were usually named after the jurists who were regarded as founders. The most important Sunnite schools of law are the Hanaphites, the Malikites, the Shafites, and the Hanbalites. In addition, there are Shiite schools of law.

In Islamic Law the concept of jihad is further developed and augmented. It explicitly distinguishes between a 'defensive jihad' [*Jihad ad-Da'fe*] and an 'offensive jihad' [*Jihad at-Talab*]. A defensive jihad is directed at protecting the faith, the religious community, the Islamic State, or Islamic territory. An offensive jihad is directed at propagating Islam among unbelievers. The reason for this distinction is found in further expansion of the territory in which the jihad is waged (see below). This has everything to do with a broadening of the context in which the fight was waged. The jihad was initially a fight between believers and unbelievers and directed at defending and propagating the faith and the religious community. In the Tradition, the reason for waging the fight was expanded by the ideal of an Islamic State. In the period during which the Islamic Law was developed, the Islamic (unitary) state crumbled and the Islamic states and countries were brought under submission to the authority of local leaders. As a result of this, the fight was characterised more as a fight among Islamic states and countries and non-Islamic states and countries.

Despite the fact that the religious community was split up into a large number of states and countries, the ideal of establishing one Islamic nation and one religious community remained. As a result of this ideal, a new theme was included in Islamic Law, namely the delineation of Islamic territory. This led to a distinction between the 'House of Islam' [*Dar al-Islam*], the territory ruled by Islamic law and authority, and the 'House of War' [*Dar al-Harb*], the countries that had not yet been submitted to the moral and political rule of Islam. The 'House of War' is sometimes also referred to as the 'House of Disbelief' [*Dar al-Kufr*]. Later on, the advance of the Islamic State faltered, as a result of which an offensive armed fight, or war, was no longer obvious. A new concept and category were consequently introduced, namely the 'House of Treaty' [*Dar al-'Ahd*]. This concept refers to countries that had not yet/have not yet been brought under submission to the moral and political rule of Islam, but with which countries a treaty has been concluded.

Themes that do not occur in the Quran and the Tradition, but do occur in Islamic Law are the association with 'unjust rulers' and 'the authority and leadership of and over the armed fight, or war'. Islamic Law furthermore includes many rules on armistice and peace.

The manner in which the Quran and the Tradition were applied during the expeditions and conquests in the times of the Prophet and subsequent centuries influenced the rules and regulations on the jihad in Islamic Law. These expeditions and conquests were laid down in Islamic warfare literature. These stories do not form a coherent and ordered doctrine on the jihad.

2.4 Jihad in Islam: a bird's-eye view

The nature, scope, and means of jihad, the concept on which Jihadism is based, have developed since the days of the Prophet. These developments usually reflected the cultural, political, social, and military reality of those days. In the Mecca period, the jihad mainly related to the spiritual and individual dimension and to creating space to profess one's own faith; in the Medina period, the armed fight, or war, was added to protect the faith, the religious community, the Islamic State, and the territory. While the armed fight, or war, was initially - mainly - waged in self-defence, it was subsequently also characterised by conquests and propagating the faith.

In the centuries following the origin of Islam, it continued to develop (see the following chapters). A large variety of views developed, certainly from 1979 onwards. While the fight was initially mainly directed at unbelievers from outside the religious community, it was subsequently also directed at 'disloyal' Muslims.

The jihad was initially used to legitimate conquests and fights among states and countries. In the 20th century, the Islamists shifted the emphasis to legitimate revolutionary activities that were aimed at bringing about social and political changes within Muslim countries. Later again, the Jihadists directed the fight not only at such regimes, but also or mainly at protecting Islam against 'Jews and crusaders'. While the armed fight, or war, was initially subject to numerous restrictions, the Jihadists subsequently relegated them - to an increasing extent - to the background, or reinterpreted them in order to tailor them for the benefit of their own ideals. The armed fight, or war, was initially mainly considered as a collective duty or as a duty of those persons who were legitimately in authority. Jihadists currently consider the armed fight, or war, to be the individual duty of all Muslims.

In Islamic history, the jihad consequently has a variety of meanings, and the concept is far from clear. In Islam, there is not one central authority to authorise religious viewpoints. As a result of this, everyone is free to shop around among the different versions of the Quran, the differing views of the various schools of law, the verses in the Quran, and the words in the verses in the Quran, and a variety of interpretations of all these. Add to this the fact that all the information from the above sources has also been formulated in a variety of documents and fatwas.

One thing that has become perfectly clear from the above is that Islam and the Muslim do not exist. To demonstrate this, one only has to refer to the above-mentioned developments in the concept of jihad; the many interpretations of the concept; the split between Sunnites and Shiites; the existence of many schools of law; the many branches in Islam, political and otherwise; the diversity of the circumstances in which Muslims live; and the many ethnicities of Muslims. As a result of this, Islam and the Muslims in the 21st century do not constitute a homogenous block.

3 Historical Context of Jihadism

3.1 Context before 1979

Before 1979, the concept of jihad was used to lend some legitimacy to a variety of wars and fights, for instance those against colonial rulers in the Middle East and North Africa. This type of fight was mainly focused on obtaining independence and was of a - mainly Arabian - nationalist nature. Moreover, this fight was not by any means always violent, and was waged in an alliance of Muslims and - mostly Arabian - Christians. In this context, there was no question of a perceived fight between believers and unbelievers, or a fight to protect or propagate Islam. In other cases, the wars or fights did not have such a considerable influence on the development of Jihadism, such as the conflicts in Kashmir.

The establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt did, however, have a considerable impact on the development of Jihadism. The Muslim Brotherhood [*al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*], or Muslim Brothers, is an apolitical movement that was established in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949). Al-Banna believed that the solution to the social problems of his time could be found in Islam as it was professed in the days of the Prophet. As a result of confrontations between the Muslim Brothers and the Egyptian authorities, Hassan al-Banna was killed by the government in 1949. Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) was responsible for the further ideological development of the Muslim Brothers. The armed fight is an essential ingredient of the ideology developed by Qutb. His ideas constitute one of the two foundations of Jihadism (see section 4.3).

3.2 1979 as a turning point

The year 1979 may be considered as a turning point in the development of Jihadism. In that year, three events eventually led to a situation where Jihadists began using Islam as a means for a political and armed fight. The first crucial event was the Islamic revolution in Iran. The second event was the occupation of the holy mosque in Mecca. The third event was the invasion of Soviet troops in Afghanistan in December 1979. These events have led to a transformation of Salafism in and by Saudi Arabia.

3.2.1 Iranian Revolution (1979)

In 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-1989) established an Islamic republic in Shiite Iran. The victory of the Iranian Revolution has had a significant influence on the Islamic movement in many countries. Shiite Iran was for many, also Sunnite, Islamic organisations, an example for the realisation of an Islamic State and the application of the Sharia. The opposition of the new state against the US, the Western culture, and secularism proved to be a source of inspiration for many.

3.2.2 Occupation of the mosque in Mecca, and transformation of Salafism in and by Saudi Arabia

From the moment of establishment of the Saudi State in 1932, Salafism (see section 4.2) had provided legitimacy to the Saudi monarchy. Saudi Salafism was relatively homogeneous until 1979, and was apolitical and pro-State. The arrival of members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the fifties of the previous century, and the subsequent arrival of Muslim Brothers from other Islamic countries, undermined this relative unity. The Muslim Brothers brought their political Islam into the limelight. As a result of this, a new generation of often young Saudi Salafists arose who, just like the Muslim Brothers, showed more interest in national and international politics and did not hesitate to criticise the, in their opinion, non-Islamic leaders of their country. This new generation is referred to as 'political Salafists' or 'oppositional Salafists'.

Against the background of the Iranian Revolution, an extremely orthodox and extremist Salafist group occupied the holy mosque of Mecca in November 1977. They demanded the end of the reign of the Saudi family. They blamed the family for being corrupt and demonstrating Western decadence, and not having legitimacy. In addition, in December of the same year, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan (see below). As a result of this, the tension between the apolitical - and pro-State - Salafists and the political - and oppositional - Salafists increased.

The Saudi authorities experienced the Iranian Revolution, the occupation of the mosque in Mecca, and the invasion of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan as a threat. As a reaction to this, they propagated their own orthodox and conservative version of Islam and provided support to moderately religious and political organisation in the Sunnite Muslim countries. They furthermore provided political, moral, and financial support to the jihad in Afghanistan. Finally, they encouraged their own militant Islamists to leave the country and go abroad. As a result of this, Salafism as an orthodox and harmless state religion was drastically transformed as regards contents and objectives.

3.2.3 Jihad in Afghanistan

At the end of 1979, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan. The fighters countering the invasion, the Mujahedin, received military and financial support from many countries, including the US, China, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and other Muslim countries. Many religious scholars and ideologists defined and legitimised this war as a defensive jihad. After considerable losses in a guerrilla war that lasted ten years, the Soviet Union withdrew permanently from Afghanistan on 15 February 1989. At the time, the Jihadists did not only have an ideology, a strategy and spiritual and military leaders, the war had also fuelled the desire to continue the fight. The fighters were ready for new instructions, enemies, and fronts, or for a resumption of the fight against the current regimes in the countries of origin. After the Soviet Union had withdrawn, the cooperation among the fighters in Afghanistan itself crumbled as a result of religious and political feuds. Many fighters, including Osama Bin Laden, returned to their countries of origin or fled to countries where they were granted asylum. From 1994 onwards, the Taliban, one group of fighters, succeeded in conquering increasingly larger areas of Afghanistan. They established the 'Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan'. Bin Laden, first man of al-Qaeda, returned to Afghanistan in 1996, together with adherents and their families. They received protection from the 'Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan'. A terrorist infrastructure was built in Afghanistan, and from here many terrorist organisations were supported or attacks planned, including the attack of 2001 in the US.

When the jihad began in Afghanistan in 1979, no specific ideological framework had been established. There was no question of any independent strategic planning or independent military strategic thinking. From around 1983 onwards, the need for a binding ideology and strategy was increasingly felt, and these were subsequently developed.

3.3 Proliferation and globalisation of the jihad (1990 – to date)

The gradual falling apart of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991 was accompanied by territorial disintegration, struggles for independence, civil wars, and ethnic-religious conflicts. In 1991, the Soviet republics became independent. Several of these republics had a predominantly Muslim population, namely Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. In the same period, between 1989 and 1992, the Yugoslavian Federation slowly fell apart. The crises of power, internal political conflicts, and civil

wars which had arisen and the subsequent ideological vacuum in several countries and regions offered ample opportunity for the Jihadist movement to expand. In Bosnia, Chechnya, Algeria, and a number of countries in Central Asia, the Afghan veterans used their experiences in attempts to establish an Islamic State. They also succeeded in redefining ethnic and other types of conflicts in Bosnia and Chechnya in Jihadist terms, namely as the reconquest of Islamic territory that had been occupied unlawfully by unbelievers. The Afghan veterans who were no longer welcome in their countries of origin found refuge in Europe. Europe was regarded as a potential home base, where logistic structures could be built to support the jihad. Especially Great Britain, and London in particular, became an attractive place to settle for Muslim Brothers and Jihadists who had been expelled or who had fled. Bosnia was regarded as a front for the armed fight.

3.4 Gulf War 1990-1991

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and Saddam Hussein declared that Kuwait was a province of Iraq. The invasion was almost immediately denounced at the international level. The US brought troops to the region to counter any Iraqi attack in Saudi Arabia. This led to great tension in Saudi Arabia and Muslim countries. The US organised a large international force that eventually led to Operation Desert Storm in the night of 16 to 17 January.

This invasion in Kuwait put the Saudi State under pressure. The 'Council of Senior Scholars' issued a fatwa shortly after that invasion, which legitimised the arrival of American troops. This fatwa, the deployment of American troops on holy Saudi territory, and the liberation from this territory caused an enormous shock within the Salafist movement in and outside Saudi Arabia. The Gulf War was also reason for the Saudi opposition and the Afghanistan veterans who had returned to seek confrontation with the Saudi authorities. This increased the differences of opinion between the apolitical - pro-state - Salafists and the political - oppositional - Salafists. A variant of Jihadism developed in Saudi Arabia. Adherents of this variant carried out numerous attacks in Saudi Arabia.

The encampment of US troops in Saudi Arabia and the first Gulf War stirred up a political and strategic thinking process within the Jihadist movement. Since then, the US has functioned as an 'enemy of Muslims' by analogy with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

3.5 The 9/11 Attacks in the US

On 11 September 2001, al-Qaeda carried out four terrorist attacks in the US. The Bush administration considered the attacks as a direct declaration of war and it declared war on terrorism. The US implemented numerous measures in the name of this 'war on terrorism'.

Shortly after those attacks, the US requested the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to extradite Bin Laden. After expiry of an ultimatum, the US started bombing Taliban positions in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, followed by the invasion of troops. With this invasion, the then 'Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan' was overthrown and the Jihadist movement lost its home base. In the perception of Jihadists, the Emirate has in the meanwhile been re-established. The war in Afghanistan has continued to this day, and there is no prospect of a rapid conclusion to the war.

The attacks in the US, the subsequent political developments, and the war against terrorism caused the Jihadists to reflect thoroughly on the objectives of the jihad. Although the Jihadist movement had received

a severe blow as a result of the worldwide reaction, the Jihadists regard the attacks of 11 September as a victory.

3.6 War in Iraq (2003 - to date)

Since 2002, the preparatory period for the actual invasion on 20 March 2003, Iraq has provided a new strategic theme and a new battle scene for Jihadists. In the perception of Jihadists, the war in Iraq placed the conflict between 'Islam' and the 'apex of disbelief', a term which the Jihadists use to refer to the US, in the heart of the Muslim world. They looked at the invasion from the deeply-rooted perspective held since 1998 of '*global jihad against Jews and Crusaders.*' According to Jihadist authors, the confrontation with the US and the West added a new dimension to the jihad. It marked the beginning of a global jihad. In this context, the war is waged against the 'distant enemy', the US and its allies (also referred to as Jews and Crusaders) hand in hand with the war against the 'close enemy', the disloyal regimes that support them. The war in Iraq provided many new impetuses to the Jihadist ideology and strategy.

3.7 A closer look at the historical context

The foundation for Jihadism was laid before 1979, mainly in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The political Islam, which has its roots in Muslim countries, is a reaction to the major social changes and problems in those countries, and originates from the need for social and political changes. The year 1979 may be regarded as the turning point in the development of Jihadism as a result of the three above-mentioned events in that year. From 1979 onwards, Jihadists placed the armed fight more and more in the perspective of the attack of 'Jews and Crusaders' on Islam and - former - Islamic territory. They also focused the armed fight, whether or not in conjunction with this development, on regimes in Muslim countries which - in the eyes of Jihadists - were disloyal regimes

From 1979 onwards, the ideology and strategy have developed strongly. This development concerned theoretical comprehension as well as reinterpretation of the traditional concept of jihad from the Quran, Tradition, and Islamic Law. It also concerned reinterpretation in the light of the political situation in various Muslim countries, and the ever changing international relationships. On and as a result of new battle scenes, a 'cross-pollination' with respect to views, concepts, and strategies took place among numerous branches and ideologies, strategists, and leaders. The result, a new concept of jihad, was tested and tailored on the jihad battlefield. The experiences and insights gained then served as a basis for the further development of the ideology and strategy. This thought process resulted in a multiplicity of beliefs, concepts, and views. The concepts and views that were originally developed in a specifically historical and political context were used more and more in different contexts, and were further enriched. In the course of time, these concepts and views increasingly took on the character of generally accepted and applicable basic principles.

4 Branches, Ideologists, and Strategists

4.1 Introduction

This chapter deals in greater depth with two important foundations of Jihadism, the Salafist doctrine and the ideology of the Muslim Brothers, or more specifically the ideas of Sayyid Qutb. This chapter also gives a description of several branches that can be distinguished in Jihadism. In addition, a brief summary is given of each of the most prominent ideologists, strategists, and leaders who directly or indirectly contributed to the development of Jihadism.

4.2 Salafisme

Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) is the spiritual founder of 'Wahhabism', a branch within Salafism, which has meanwhile gained the upper hand. It is an extreme orthodox branch in (Sunnite) Islam that advocates a return to pure Islam as it was professed in the days of the Prophet Muhammad and by the four rightful caliphs in the subsequent centuries. Salafism or Salafists literary means pious and fair-minded predecessors. It is a puritan branch based on a strict and literal interpretation of the Quran and the Tradition.

Although the Wahhabist branch has gained the upper hand, the term 'Salafism' has been used in this publication for the following reasons:

1. The term 'Wahhabism' mainly refers to its founder and the doctrine he developed. This has meanwhile been supplemented by the views of his adherents. As a result of this, Salafism has become a branch that is broader than that of his founder.
2. The adherents of Wahhabism identify themselves as Salafists and not as Wahhabists. The term Wahhabist suggests too strongly that they are adherents of Wahhab instead of God. By choosing for the term 'Salafism', we adhere to the current jargon.
3. The term Wahhabism gives the impression of being historically and geographically bound to the movement that has its roots in eighteenth century Saudi Arabia. Salafism, on the other hand, is a modern and global movement.
4. It is true that the Jihadist groups that are allied to al-Qaeda have much respect for Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, but they identify with Salafism as a movement or spiritual school of thought.

From 1979 onwards, three variants of Salafism gradually developed (see sections 3.2.23.2.2 and 3.43.4). The first variant - the apolitical or pro-state variant - was propagated by the official theologians and clerics of the 'Council of Senior Scholars' in Saudi Arabia. Due to the close ties between that council and the Saudi state, this variant may be called a 'pro-state variant of Salafism'.¹ The emphasis in this variant is on dawah as an instrument of change. It is particularly this variant that has been transported to the West. Its adherents adopt a loyal attitude to the established regimes in Muslim countries and refrain from adopting clear political positions regarding Western countries, for instance, in connection with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In this context, they follow the official positions adopted by Saudi Arabia and other states.

The second variant - political or oppositional Salafism - mainly focuses on political activities as necessary change instrument. These ideas have also pervaded the West. Its adherents adopt an oppositional attitude

¹ This does not by definition mean that all adherents of this variant in Saudi Arabia are allied to the states or are favourably inclined towards it. They do not interfere in the (daily) course of events.

to the established regimes in Muslim countries and not so much to the governments of the Western countries in which they reside. The adherents in Muslim countries, however, adopt a clearly critical position on the politics pursued by the West, for instance, with regard to the Palestinian issue. Oppositional Salafism is furthermore critically inclined towards specific elements of the integration policy pursued in the West, such as the ban on wearing burkas.

The third variant is a Jihadist variant of Salafism. This is the most radical form of Salafism. Its adherents do not believe that the desired change can be achieved in a peaceful way, and they want to achieve these changes by waging an armed fight.

Present-day Salafism is a mix of the following eight central concepts or doctrines that are closely associated and interrelated :

1. The Oneness of God [*Tawhid*];
2. Belief and disbelief [*Iman and Kufr*];
3. Worship of God [*Ibada*];
4. The duty to apply divine laws and legislation [*al-Hukm bi-ma Anzala Allah*];
5. Loyalty and Enmity [*al-Walaa wal-Baraa*];
6. The society of Muslims [*Jama'at al-Muslimin*];
7. Preaching and missionary work [*ad-Dawah*]; and
8. The armed fight [*al-Jihad*].

These concepts will be discussed in greater detail in section 5.1.

Salafism attaches various meanings and functions to the concept of jihad in the meaning of armed fight. It is first of all a realisation of the doctrine of oneness of God. In addition, it is a means to apply divine laws and legislation. It also constitutes the prerequisite for the protection of preaching the divine message and the religious community. The concept of jihad is consequently closely related to the above-mentioned doctrines of Salafism. Salafism considers waging the jihad to be the religious duty of each Muslim and one of the most important services of honour. It should be noted that there may be a considerable difference between an ideology and the manner in which it is complied with. The obligation may also be performed in different forms, such as by donating money.

The pro-state or apolitical variant of Salafism is based on the view that the jihad may only be waged by legitimate persons in authority and in special circumstances. This variant does not focus on an offensive jihad, the armed fight that is directed at propagating Islam among unbelievers. The oppositional or political variant of Salafism blames the current persons in authority in Muslim countries for failing to wage the jihad or to support it where necessary. According to them, the jihad is lawful in specific Muslim countries, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and Algeria. This variant is ambiguous in relation to the offensive jihad: they do not call on people to wage the jihad, but they do not distance themselves from it either. The Jihadist variant goes much further (see section 5.1.8). It expands the circumstances in which the jihad may be waged and sets aside many restrictions, and also strives for an offensive jihad.

4.3 Ideology of Muslim Brothers and ideas of Sayyid Qutb

The ideology of the Muslim Brothers is mainly directed at reforming society, politics, and the state with the aim of returning religious values in all domains of political and social life. The ideology of the Muslim

Brothers, too, has central concepts which are mutually overlapping. These concepts are :

1. The period of unbelief and amorality [*Jahiliyya*];
2. The religious community [*Umma*];
3. The sovereignty of God [*Hakimiyya*]; and
4. The revolutions by means of jihad and dawah.

'Jahiliyya' refers to the pre-Islamic period, the period before the Prophet Muhammad. This period was characterised by unbelief, ignorance, and amorality. Islam liberated the inhabitants of Arabia in that period. According to Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), Muslims in his days were, once again, living in a modern Jahiliyya.

Sayyid Qutb provided the concept of religious community with a new interpretation, and gave it a new revolutionary meaning. The Islamic faith and the Islamic State constitute the basis and the binding element of the Islamic religious community, and not Western concepts such as nation and people. The creation of the religious community is one step in the direction of putting an end to the Jahiliyya and one step in the direction of an Islamic State.

The sovereignty of God [*Hakimiyya*] is a comprehensive system comprising ethics, politics, legal order, and global leadership, and applies to all Muslims. This is in keeping with the Salafist doctrine of 'oneness of God'. What is new, however, is that according to Sayyid Qutb the jihad is necessary to create a true Islamic State. This state must be founded on the model of the original religious community as established by the Prophet Muhammad. Sayyid Qutb considered all political systems and regimes as tyrannical [*Taghut*] and in conflict with the sovereignty of God.

The revolution, in the form of jihad and dawah, must be given substance by an Islamic vanguard. The revolution is staged in three phases, which, by analogy with communism, can be regarded as creating class-consciousness, building strength, and entering into combat.

Sayyid Qutb's ideas differ considerably from the classical meaning of jihad and are given a political meaning. Sayyid Qutb not only provided a picture of an external enemy, but also one of an internal enemy, namely the false Muslims and tyrannical rulers. It is permitted and necessary to wage the jihad against them. Sayyid Qutb was of the opinion that preaching and missionary work [*Dawah*] alone would not suffice to realise God's dominance over the earth. He therefore held the view that the offensive jihad was necessary as a means to propagate the Islamic faith as a universally applicable religion.

4.4 Similarities and differences in ideologies

The Jihadist ideology is composed of extremist and violent elements from mainly the Salafist doctrine and the ideas of Sayyid Qutb, the leading ideologist of the Muslim Brothers. Jihadists hold the view that Salafists and Muslim Brothers do not adequately comply with the doctrines of their masters. Salafists and Muslim Brothers both distance themselves from Jihadism and the terrorism that is inherently related to it. They advocate dawah and political reforms as a means to bring about the desired changes. Jihadists, on the other hand, mainly advocate the armed fight and modify the preconditions that must be met by the jihad and the circumstances in which it may be waged. Among Salafists, Muslim Brothers, and Jihadists there is consensus about the view that the duty of jihad applies unabatedly to the fight against Israel.

4.5 Branches within Jihadism

Various branches within Jihadism have influenced its continued development. Characteristic of the *Jordan, Palestinian, and Syrian branch*² is the primacy of the liberation of the Islamic territory. This branch is furthermore strongly oriented towards building up Islamic institutions and organisations. The *Egyptian branch* has established a tradition in the formulation of a theory around the ‘application of divine laws and legislation’ and the exclusive divine competency for making laws. The *Saudi branch* broke new ground in the development of the Jihadist ideology before and after the attacks of 11 September 2001. The Saudi ideologists have centred their ideas on America as a distant enemy. This branch has put much emphasis on using scholars and preachers to incite believers to prepare for and participate in the jihad. The Saudi Jihadist movement furthermore set the tone in virtualising Jihadist institutions and broke new ground for using women for the jihad. Within the European branch, a variety of Jihadist ideologists, institutions, and networks are active. This branch elaborated on the theoretic development of Jihadist ideologists from the core of the Muslim world. As a result, it hardly brought about any substantive renewal. All the other Jihadist branches have also found a place within the European branch. In respect of this branch, Europe functions as a territory for the jihad and as a basis to fall back upon and from which the Jihadist ideology can be propagated and preparations for the jihad can be made.

4.6 Ibn Taymiyya

Taqiy Din Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) developed many aspects of the jihad during his time. His views are still influential in the current positions adopted by the Muslim Brothers, Salafists, and Jihadists. Ibn Taymiyya held the view that the armed fight was also permitted against members of the religious community if they had violated Islamic law, in other words, against ‘disloyal regimes and Muslims’. His work was also characterised by the endeavour to prevent the faith from being innovated. He considered the tenets of the original Islam - as practised in the days of the Prophet and the first four successors, the four rightful caliphs - to be the guiding principle.

4.7 Abdullah Azzam

The Palestinian Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989) holds an important position in the history of Jihadism. The formation of Azzam’s theory in the area of the jihad has made it possible that the current conflicts are embedded in the classical reference framework of Islamic theology and dogmatic theology. Azzam radically legitimised a one-sided political view of the jihad, in which political violence and war prevail. He provided, for instance, new insights and perspectives for the jihad. He drew attention to the Islamic territory, and restored the martyrdom culture in Sunnite circles. Azzam drew his thoughts and arguments from the Quran, the Tradition, and the classic jihad doctrine as well as from the ideologies of the Muslim Brothers and Saudi Salafism. He achieved a synthesis of the ideologies of the Muslim Brothers and Saudi Salafism. He also played a leading role in the jihad in Afghanistan in the eighties, for he was the theorist of the jihad, organiser of logistics, fund raiser, and networker. In Peshawar on the Afghan border, he formalised his cooperation with Osama Bin Laden in 1984 by establishing ‘the (Afghan) Service Agency [*Maktab al-Khadamat*]. This agency is regarded as a precursor of al-Qaeda.

Many, including Osama Bin Laden, Abu Muhammad al-Maqqdisi, Abu Musab as-Suri, and Ayman al-Zawahiri,

² This movement does not include Hamas and Hezbollah and is based on (the ideas) of ideologists and strategists who were born and/or lived in those countries.

have been inspired by Azzam. His most important works are *Defense of Muslim Lands* and *Join the Caravan*. The ideas of Sayyid Qutb functioned as a source of inspiration for Azzam.

4.8 Abu Mohammed al-Maqdissi

The Palestinian Abu Muhammad al-Maqdissi is the pseudonym of Isam Tahir al-Barqawi (1959). He has contributed substantially to the development of the Jihadist ideology. He is currently said to be the most influential Jihadist ideologist. With his works, he has defined the dogmatic theological frameworks of the jihad with the related political course. He has actualised the concept of 'denunciation' [*Takfir*] and politicised many aspects of the Islamic faith. He has developed the concept of denouncing institutions. He has also advocated the countering of democracy, as being a false religion that conflicts with the divine laws and regulations.

Al-Maqdissi has been inspired by Azzam. He was the teacher of several ideologists and jihad fighters in Iraq, including al-Zarqawi, the first leader of 'al-Qaeda in Iraq'. His most important works are *The Religion of Abraham* (1985) en *Democracy: a Religion!* (1997). Other works are *Clear Evidence of the Infidel Nature of the Saudi State* (1995), and *This is Our Faith*.

4.9 Abu Musab as-Suri

The Syrian Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (1958), better known as Abu Musab as-Suri, is one of the leading strategists and ideologists of the Jihadist movement. His aliases are Mustafa Sitmaryan Nassar, Umar Abd al-Hakim, or Omar Abdulhakim. He is the prototype of a Jihadist strategist. He developed the synthesis of evaluation, experiences, and new notions, and outlined the course for the future. As-Suri has put the jihad in an international perspective. He holds the view that global Islamic resistance against the US, its allies, and disloyal regimes must be organised. He developed a model for so-called Jihadist resistance brigades, as a form of jihad without leaders.

Just like the other ideologists and strategists, as-Suri has been inspired by the ideological and political ideas of the Muslim Brothers and Salafists. His favourite references are Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. As-Suri is one of Azzam's 'disciples'. His most important work is *Call for Global Islamic Resistance* (2004 or at the beginning of 2005).

4.10 Ayman al-Zawahiri

The Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri (1951), the current second man of the core of al-Qaeda, forms a link - with respect to the contents of his message - between the ideas of Azzam about the jihad in the eighties and the new generation of ideologists of Jihadism of the nineties. He has profiled himself as a thinker and a strategist of al-Qaeda. He developed the concept of the 'distant enemy' and the mobilisation of the masses. He also stressed the importance of 'loyalty and enmity', resulting in a religious conflict in the form of jihad. He translated the theological and dogmatic substantiation of suicide attack in concrete political terms. In media performances since September 2001, he systematically translated the strategic goals of al-Qaeda in concrete political statements and propaganda which is easily accessible to the ordinary Muslim. To date of writing this publication, he is still often heard through all kinds of messages on numerous topics.

Al-Zawahiri has been influenced strongly by Sayyid Qutb, Azzam, al-Maqdisi, and Sayyid Iman al-Sharif.

His most important works are *Knights under the Prophet's Banner* and *Loyalty and Enmity: An Inherited Doctrine and Lost Reality*.

4.11 Sayyid Imam Sharif

The Egyptian Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (1950), also known by the names of Abdulkadir Abdulaziz, or Doctor Fadl, counts as an authoritative theorist of the jihad in the eighties and nineties. The concepts he developed for this purpose have been adopted in many Jihadist circles. He counts as an ultra extremist ideologist. Within al-Qaeda he has dedicated himself to - among other things - the ideological productions about the jihad.

Sayyid Imam al-Sharif laid the foundations for training their own scholars for the Jihadist movement. As a result of this, the official bodies of state scholars will become redundant. He has adopted the position that the jihad could actually be waged without a legitimate person in authority. He holds the view that jihad fighters can choose a leader themselves. He laid the dogmatic foundation for the Jihadist concept of leadership and military discipline, which is absolute obedience and loyalty to the 'Emir'. His ideas were furthermore decisive in designing al-Qaeda's organisational structure, for he is the inventor of the concept of the 'Judicial Islamic Body', an essential part of each Jihadist group (see section 7.2).

He has been influenced by Abdusalam Faraj and Azzam, and he, in his turn, has influenced al-Zawahiri. His most important works are *The Compendium of the Pursuit of Divine Knowledge* and *Essential of Making Ready*.

In 2007, Sayyid Imam al-Sharif wrote from prison that he supported the initiative of the Egyptian 'al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya' to review its violent course. His expression of regret and his renunciation of the armed fight may become an important point of controversy for al-Qaeda and the Jihadist movement. His arguments are after all not of a strategic nature, but religious and judicial and his influence on al-Zawahiri has always been considerable. Opponents of his expression of regret may argue that his new ideas were brought about under pressure during his imprisonment. The fierce and substantive reactions, however, show that the leaders of the core of al-Qaeda are sincerely worried about the expression of regret.

4.12 Osama Bin Laden

The Saudi Osama Bin Laden (1957) may be labelled as the charismatic leader of al-Qaeda and the Jihadist movement. Bin Laden does not have the intellectual fervour or the strategic insights of al-Zawahiri. He obtains his authority from his commitment to the jihad and the symbolism of self-sacrifice he personifies. He is after all a multimillionaire who has given all his worldly riches to Islam and the jihad for the sake of God.

In February 1998, he established the *World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders* in Afghanistan. With this statement, he created the foundations for a global terrorist network. This is an important milestone in the origin of al-Qaeda which has since then been responsible for a large number of attacks. Another contribution is the emphasis on the importance of delegitimising religious scholars or convincing them to take sides with Jihadism, for they constitute a strategic link in the mobilisation of the religious community.

Bin Laden rose to the forefront of attention in a period that was characterised by an ideological vacuum. This vacuum was the result of the disintegration of ideologies of socialism and Arabian nationalism in the Arabian and Muslim countries and the incapacity of the current regimes to implement democratic reforms. Through the new media, and in particular through Al-Jazeera, Bin Laden has been able to create a distinct profile for himself. He has succeeded in bringing across the ideological message of Jihadism to the man in the street by using plain language through the TV channels. In doing so, he developed into a political leader.

Bin Laden has been influenced by Abdullah Azzam and Muhammad Qutb, Sayyid Qutb's brother. His most important works are *Letter to the religious community* (2003), *Riyadh attack of 12 May 2003 and the war against America and their allies* and *Methodological Guidelines* (2004).

5 Jihadist Ideology

5.1 Central concepts of Jihadist ideology

The Jihadist ideology consists of a mix of central concepts that are closely interrelated and connected. It adopts the above-mentioned eight doctrines of Salafism, but some elements of these doctrines are given another meaning and, sometimes, extreme consequences are attached to it. One central concept has been added, namely the concept of 'Caliphate in accordance with the model of the religious community of the Prophet'.

In describing and explaining the central concepts, the universal systematics of religious studies has been applied. On this basis, it is possible to divide each religion into the following components: theology (concept of God); dogma (doctrines of the faith); liturgy (worship and rituals); ethics (values and manners); law (laws and regulations); community (human relationships); politics (power); and war and peace. This universal pattern can also be applied to Islam, and in particular to the Salafist and Jihadist interpretation of Islam. Broadly speaking, these systematics correspond to the order and structure of the Jihadist manifests. The description and explanation is given below.

5.1.1 The Oneness of God

The abstract theological and dogmatic concept of 'The Oneness of God', as it occurs in the Quran and the Tradition, is expanded by Salafism and further interpreted in terms of power, authority, and politics. God is the only entity that may lay down and prescribes laws and regulations. The believers must submit to the divine authority and may only exercise authority by mandate. Deviating from, changing, and innovating this central concept is regarded as 'deviation' [*Dhalal*] and 'heresy' [*Rufi*]. The consequences of developing the central concept of 'The Oneness of God' have not been specified in Salafism.

Jihadist ideologists, however, attach the following consequences to the development of this concept:

1. positive law;
2. secular legislative bodies and authorities;
3. the separation of Church and State; and
4. democracy.

As a result of this, the concept of 'The Oneness of God' forms the basis of theocracy, a crucial theme in Jihadism.

5.1.2 Belief and disbelief

In Salafism, 'belief' is a central concept, just like its opposite, 'disbelief'. Individuals and groups who are not religious, who are disloyal, or who belong to another movement in Islam are denounced [*Takfir*]. Muslims who have adopted a slightly deviating position may also be denounced.

In Jihadism, the concept of 'Belief and disbelief' has been developed in accordance with the form and contents of the religious community and the relationship of Muslims to non-Muslims. Those adhering to other religious, philosophical, and political views are considered disloyal. Because of this, they do not belong to the Muslim community. This concept leads to the identification of the following enemies:

1. Unbelievers. This category includes Jews, Christians, polytheists, humanists, atheists, and all other adherents to religious, philosophical, and political views that do not belong to Islam. This also includes secularism in all its manifestations, such as nationalism, socialism, and communism.

2. Disloyal Muslims. These are Muslims who have consciously renounced Islam or who have placed themselves outside the religious community because they think or act contrary to Islam. Jihadism considers disloyalty to be worse than disbelief.
 3. Special groups within Islam, such as the Shiites, who are considered unbelievers.
- Unless explicitly stated otherwise, this publication uses the collective term of ‘unbelievers’.

Jihadism aims its arrows specifically at several frequently mentioned enemies. One of these enemies is formed by the disloyal regimes and institutions in Muslim countries. A second enemy is the ‘global unbelieving democratic system’ [*Nizham ad-Dimocratiyya al-Kkufri al-Alami*] under the leadership of the US and its allies. A third enemy is the West, more and more frequently referred to as Jews and Crusaders. The US is regarded as fourth enemy and qualified as ‘the apex of disbelief’ [*Ra’s al-Kufri*].

In addition to the denunciation of individuals and groups, Jihadism also denounces institutions, the state, authority, and laws and regulations. The armed fight against unbelievers follows from the distinction between belief and disbelief.

5.1.3 *Worship of God*

The Quran states that belief and worship of (or veneration of) God are inextricably bound together. The faith in God is translated into worship and rituals [*lbada*]. God is the only entity that deserves worship and veneration. According to Salafism, veneration of God is only valid and pure when it is coupled to the renunciation of idolatry. Faith is not something that is only professed in words. It must be translated into deeds, actions and examples of behaviour. This has been translated into, among other things, the five Islamic pillars (profession of faith, prayer, fasting, payment of religious tax, and pilgrimage). These forms of worship are of a collective nature. In Salafism, worship is actually a collective duty.

Jihadism has copied this concept indiscriminately from the Salafist doctrine, but gives it a political twist by stating that worship presupposes obedience and submission to God. It implies a collective rejection of each form of obedience and submission to any other authority or law. This leads to a system of total rejection of secular authority, tyranny, the current legal order and political systems [*Taghut*]. Jihadism considers the armed fight and the death that may result from this the highest form of worship and submission to God.

5.1.4 *Duty to apply divine laws and regulations*

Belief is inextricably bound up with actions. According to Salafism, belief in God means to act in accordance with His Words, as these are contained in the Quran. The failure to govern with and apply divine laws and regulations is equal to disbelief and heresy. People are therefore obliged to apply the divine laws and regulations. Only God has the power to govern and make laws. Nobody else shares this with Him. According to Salafism, Islamic Law is the basis of divine laws and regulations. The application of positive law¹ may therefore be qualified as disbelief. Compliance with this law is qualified as pure disbelief, and places the individual outside the Muslim community. For Salafists living in the West, this duty creates a conflict with the duty to comply with the law of the country in which they reside. They usually deal pragmatically with this conflict.

Jihadism radicalises the views of Salafism about the necessity to apply divine laws and regulations. It explicitly makes the issue of authority and the power to make laws and regulations a central doctrine. God is the only entity with the power to make laws and regulations. It follows from this that any legislation made by human beings in the form of positive law must be rejected as unbelieving. The divine laws and regulations must be applied in all aspects of private Muslim life. Persons in authority who apply other laws and regulations than the divine laws and regulations are guilty of disbelief. Because the Jihadists hold the view that institutions and authorities in Muslim countries put aside, change or reject the divine laws and regulations, they are considered to be disbelieving countries.

On the basis of the foregoing line of reasoning, Jihadism rejects democracy. For this reason, those having a seat in institutions that have developed from democracy are disloyal. The regimes in Muslim countries are consequently labelled as disloyal. The Islamic system of (informal) 'consultation' [*Shura*] is permitted, though. An essential difference is, for instance, that this does not involve any legislation, co-legislation, or exercise of power. Jihadism may consequently be qualified as theocratic and antidemocratic. It strives for a society that is completely organised in accordance with God's law and that directly leads to the establishment of an Islamic State.

5.1.5 Loyalty and Enmity

The Quran is ambiguous about the relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims. Some verses prescribe that Muslims must treat dissenters positively. Other verses stipulate that Muslims must fight unbelievers. In this context, a distinction is made between monotheists and polytheists. The Quran does not explicitly refer to the concepts of apostasy [*Ridda*] and disloyalty [*Murtaddun*]. This expansion was made later on by Ibn Taymiyya (see section 4.6).

According to Salafism, a Muslim must profess loyalty to his fellow believers and turn away from unbelievers. Loyalty and Enmity are two sides of the same coin. The religious community ensues, so to speak, from loyalty among Muslims. Muslims are linked with each other on the basis of their faith and not on the basis of their ethnicity, patriotism, or nationality. The opposite of loyalty is enmity. Each Muslim must turn away from disbelief and unbelievers. Salafism forbids loyalty to unbelievers. According to Salafism, the only relationship Muslims may have with unbelievers is a strict minimum of politeness and the systematic and unabated efforts to convert unbelievers to Islam.

Jihadism copies this doctrine and uses this to incite hatred. It forms the basis of intolerance, racism, and anti-Semitism. On the basis of this principle, the minds of Muslims are prepared for the armed fight against unbelievers. This doctrine is consequently the premise for the jihad, and is used to legitimise the renunciation of disloyal regimes in Muslim countries and the scholars that support those regimes.

¹ *"Positive law - also referred to as current law or objective law - is the law that applies at a specific moment or a specific place. The law, for instance, that is in force in Belgium today is Belgian positive law. The Latin term is lege lata. Positive law is made and recognised within a community; the authorities ensure that it is respected. On account of this it is distinguished from natural law, the ideal law that is not enforced by an authority, but which is embedded in human beings." This description is a translation of the definition in the Dutch Wikipedia, page was last modified on 14 November 2007 at 01:01.*

5.1.6 *The society of Muslims*

Salafism stresses the collective aspect of faith in terms of compliance with the doctrine of the Oneness of God, worship, loyalty, and compliance with the divine laws and regulations. Collectivity is the basis of the religious community [Umma]. Muslims are linked by their faith and the brotherhood resulting from this faith. On that account, they owe each other loyalty. Salafism regards the original religious community, as formed by the Prophet in Mecca and Medina and the rightful caliphs, as the ideal to be achieved. To realise this, a vanguard is required. This vanguard preaches the pure and rightful faith and also fights for it. Salafism considers itself a group that professes, protects, and defends the rightful and pure faith.

Jihadism elaborates on the foregoing, and attaches political consequences to it. Jihadism draws the conclusion that the current situation of the religious community is very serious. The Muslim community can win back its glory by realising again (the Jihadist interpretation of) the model of the establishment of the first religious community in the days of the Prophet. The fact that it is an interpretation is apparent, for instance, from the fact that the Prophet brought about a 'treaty of the religious community' [*Ahd al-Umma*] in Medina which provided that Jews had the right to freely profess their faith.

Jihadists, just like Salafists, for that matter, consider themselves to be the only rightful representatives of the first religious community. Jihadists form a vanguard or 'chosen group'. This vanguard may use violence to purify, protect, and propagate the faith. With the concept of 'chosen group', Jihadism proclaims itself to be a chosen vanguard which has an absolute claim to the truth and draws sharp dividing lines between believers and unbelievers. Jihadists do not only know exactly what is right and what is wrong, they know even better who are the good persons and who are the bad persons. In this sense, the Jihadist movement is a sectarian group.

5.1.7 *Dawah*

Salafism focuses on propagating the religious views and putting them into practice. They consider dawah, which stands for preaching and missionary work, the appropriate means to do this.

In Jihadism, dawah focuses on the preparations for the jihad. The fight against unbelievers is waged depending on the strength of the Muslims and the balance of power with regard to the unbelievers. When the vanguard does not have any power, the fight will mainly have to be waged in the form of dawah. When the vanguard has power, the dawah will be strengthened by the use of weapons and means of coercion, or, in other words, the armed fight.

In Jihadism, the moral principle of 'encouraging the good and combating the evil' that is included in the Quran is used to correct types of behaviour in society in addition to propagating the rightful faith. Jihadism considers the correction of deviant behaviour to be an important element of the dawah. This is referred to as 'accountability' [*Hisba*]. Jihadism also interprets this as the fight against Western norms and values. As a result of this, Jihadism may be regarded as anti-modernist and anti-liberal. On the basis of this moral principle, Jihadism also fights against the current regimes in Muslim countries and the Western norms and values.

5.1.8 *Jihad*

Salafism considers waging the jihad the religious duty of each Muslim. The jihad must be waged against

unbelievers. Salafists hold the view that the armed fight may only be waged in special circumstances and under the leadership of one legitimate Muslim person in authority (see section 4.2).

Jihadists go much further than Salafists where the armed fight is involved, and expand the circumstances in which it may be waged. According to Jihadism, the duty of jihad ensues from theologically dogmatic, liturgical, and right-wing Islamic basic principles. Jihad ensues from the permanent conflict between good and evil, between Islam and disbelief. Waging the jihad is a permanent assignment that will continue to exist until Judgment Day (see section 5.2.2). It is pre-eminently a divine assignment and is consequently part of the divine laws and regulations that must be applied. Complying with this assignment is a form of veneration of God. The jihad is the means to realise the doctrine of 'the Oneness of God'. The jihad is the only logical and right-wing Islamic means to restore the sovereignty and the authority of God. The ultimate goal of the jihad is to establish the faith of God and ensure that it is applied. The armed fight also constitutes a requirement for the establishment of the Islamic State in a substantive sense. God has entrusted the vanguard to wage the armed fight. Together with the Jihadist scholars, the jihad fighters form the vanguard of the Muslim community and will ensure its welfare and salvation. With a divine method, they will guide the religious community to its goals. According to Jihadism, the duty of jihad shall not cease to exist in the absence of a leader or an Islamic State. If there is not any religious and fair leader available, the duty to carry on the fight remains. Muslims may wage the jihad either individually or under the guidance of leaders. As stated in section 1.3.3, the concept of jihad has become a byword for armed fight, also referred to as 'holy war'. Jihadists themselves also regard war, a guerrilla war, terrorism, and sometimes also individual unrelated criminal actions as the armed fight. In this context, it concerns an armed fight fought by individuals, groups, and freedom fighters, and not by countries

A concept that is related to jihad is the concept of [*Hijra*] (see section 2.1). The concept of 'Hijra' is charged with political meaning for the Muslim Brothers, Salafists, HuT adherents as well as Jihadists. They regard it as a step after the dawah in Mecca and a step prior to the jihad, which was announced against the unbelievers from Medina. In the Salafist and Jihadist views, the concept currently refers to the migration or withdrawal from a country or territory by Muslims who cannot profess their faith. Its meaning is twofold, namely that of peaceful migration or peaceful withdrawal, but also of building up strength to return later on. It is remarkable that Jihadists regard the Hijra as a link between the dawah and the jihad. It is a temporary withdrawal or flight, with the view to build up strength in situations of weakness. By emigrating and fleeing to other countries, Muslims protect not only themselves but also their faith. During the Hijra, Muslims must work on increasing their individual strength. Hijra consequently makes it possible to build up strength to be able to wage an offensive jihad against unbelievers.

5.1.9 Caliphate

The revelations to the Prophet marked the beginning of the Islamic faith [*Din*]. The migration of the Prophet to Medina [*Hijra*] marked the beginning of the religious community [*Umma*]. This community was led by the Prophet Muhammad as leader of believers [*Amir al-Mu'minin*]. The death of the Prophet gave rise to the issue of his succession, the question of who was authorised to function as successor [*Caliph*]. The succession by the four rightful caliphs marked the beginning of a tradition of an Islamic State [*Caliphate*]. The Islamic State brought about the propagation of the faith and the expansion of the religious community, which evolved into an Islamic territory [*Dar al-Islam*], which can be considered as a Caliphate. After the four rightful caliphs, separate and autonomous states [*Dawla, plural: Duwal*] were established at

different places within the Islamic territory. Islamists regard the Ottoman Empire as the last Islamic State and as Caliphate. With the disintegration of this empire and due to Western rule, separate nation-states [*Dawla Wataniyya*], such as Egypt, were established in various Muslim countries. Islamists consider the concept of a nation-state reprehensible.

The Quran does not explicitly mention the Caliphate as an Islamic (unitary) state. The political and religious community that was established by the Prophet Muhammad, and which eventually became the Islamic State, is, however, mentioned in the Tradition. Within Salafism, the Islamic (unitary) state is not a theme and it has also not been developed explicitly. In respect of the pro-state or apolitical branch of Salafism, this has everything to do with the fact that Saudi Arabia is considered an Islamic State. They do think, however, that the other states in Muslim countries are secular and not based on an Islamic basic principle. The oppositional or political branch of Salafism, on the other hand, is clearly more critical of the existing regimes, but does not denounce them and prefers political reforms to violence.

In the ideology of the Muslim Brothers, the concept of the Islamic (unitary) state does play a role of importance. It mainly focuses on reforming society, politics, and the state, with the ultimate goal being the return of religious values in all domains of politics and social life.

In Jihadism, the Islamic State (Caliphate) constitutes an explicit central concept. Jihadism considers the establishment of the Islamic State, which can exercise control and sovereignty in the name of God, as a right-wing Islamic obligation. The purpose of an Islamic State is the establishment and protection of the Islamic faith and the application of the divine laws and regulations. The ideal form is the state that was established by the Prophet and continued by his four successors. Jihadism thinks of the Caliphate as a pan-Islamic State, a super state that contains the entire community of Muslim believers and that will have a universal character.

Jihadism considers the appointment of a leader also a divine assignment. Classical Islamic political literature uses various terms for leadership. A first term is that of 'spiritual leader' [*Imam*].² He is responsible for the protection of the faith. A second term is that of 'political leader' [*Emir*]. He promotes the interests of Muslims and defends the Islamic territory and the Islamic State. Jihadist literature uses this term for both the operational leader of a Jihadist group and for 'head of state', for instance, in the case of the self-proclaimed Emirate of Iraq. A third term is 'Caliph'. This leader heads a larger state and rules over a larger territory, over the Caliphate.

5.2 Themes of Jihadist ideology

5.2.1 Overview of themes

The central concepts of Jihadism produce a variety of themes, such as 'rejection of democracy'. Conversely, the themes often ensue from more than one concept. This has everything to do with the close interrelationship and overlapping of central concepts. Figure 5.1 shows the themes in one overview. The overview has two categories. The first category shows the nature of the theme, namely a 'negative theme' or a 'positive theme'. The criterion in this connection is whether the theme implies opposition

² In daily life, the concept of *Imam* means the person who leads the congregation of believers in prayer. The title for a spiritual leader in the Middle East and in Salafist circles is 'Sheikh'.

against something (column 1) or, on the contrary, whether the theme requires the commitment to strive for something (column 2). This dualistic nature is inherent to the Jihadist ideology and perception of the world.³ The second category shows the central concept to which the theme is most related.

Jihadism has by no means the monopoly on the themes mentioned. Salafism, for instance, also considers positive law as a form of disbelief that must be rejected. There is a variety of methods to bring about changes, including preaching and performing missionary work, withdrawing from society or institutions, performing political activities, or using violence. Characteristic of Jihadism is its activist character and the use of violence to bring about changes. In line with its activist character is the fact that the themes which Jihadism opposes have often been developed in more concrete terms than the themes to which Jihadism commits itself (see section 5.3.1).

The 'ideal image' of Jihadism can be classified in the following four main themes:

1. End Time;
2. Worldwide rule of Islam;
3. Re-establishment of the Islamic State;
4. Dawah and jihad by the vanguard as means to achieve these goals.

The relationship among these four main themes in terms of goal, means, and relationships is represented in Figure 5.2 on page 47. A detailed discussion is given in the following sections.


³ In this overview, a one-on-one connection between 'opposition against' and 'commitment to' does not exist.

There is, for instance, no connection between 'rejection of the separation of Church and State' and 'Islam is the only legitimate and acceptable faith'.

Theme: opposition against	Theme: commitment to
The Oneness of God	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rejection of democracy • Rejection of separation of Church and State 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Structure of a theocratic political system • Islam is the only legitimate and acceptable faith
Belief and disbelief	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rejection of other religious, philosophical, and political views than the Islam • Renunciation of unbelievers/ disloyal Muslims/ special groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Linking of doctrine and life (orthodoxy and orthopraxy) • Linking of religion and politics
Worship of God	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rejection of 'tyranny' [Taghut] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Martyrdom is the ultimate form of worship
Duty to apply divine laws and regulations	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rejection of laws made by people (rejection of positive law, including constitution) • Rejection of administration of justice on the basis of positive law • Rejection of secularism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation and application of divine laws and regulations
Loyalty and Enmity	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Renunciation of unbelievers, disloyal Muslims and special groups (image of the enemy) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Group cohesion and solidarity among believing Muslims
Community of Muslims	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rejection of the current situation of the religious community and society in Muslim countries • Combating of secular institutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Society on the basis of Islamic norms and values • Establishment of Islamic institutions • Vanguard within religious community to realise ideal
Dawah	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Combating Western norms and values • Combating modernity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Worldwide propagation of the pure and rightful faith • Encouraging the good en combating the evil
Jihad	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Combating disloyal regimes (close enemy) • Combating Jews and Crusaders (distant enemy) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Armed fight is the only logical and right-wing Islamic means to establish the (pure and rightful) faith and the Islamic State • Armed fight is a divine assignment and consequently a religious duty of each Muslim • Jihad as a permanent assignment until Judgment Day • Hijra to build strength
Caliphate in accordance with the Prophet's model of the religious community	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Combating unbelieving democratic world order • Combating international law and international institutions, such as the UN • Combating fragmented states in Muslim world • Combating Western rule 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment or re-establishment of the Caliphate in accordance with the Prophet's model of the religious community • Worldwide rule of Islam • Restoration of the function of the 'leader of believers' • Reconquest of former Islamic territory (Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Andalusia)

Figure 5.1 Overview of themes in Jihadist ideology

Figure 5.2 Goal-means-relationships among elements of the ideal picture of Jihadists



There is some connection between striving for worldwide rule of Islam and a re-establishment of the Islamic State, for an Islamic State implies worldwide rule of Islam and vice versa. In spite of this, both elements have been specified separately, because it involves two separate ideals, certainly from an analytical point of view, which can be realised in different ways. It would moreover be conceivable that other religions are permitted within the Islamic State. This was, for instance, the case in Medina in the days of the Prophet Muhammad.

The mirror image of the above-mentioned four main themes is a rejection of everything that opposes these themes. In this way, Jihadism rejects and condemns all other political systems, and all religious, philosophical, and political views that do not comply with Islam, meaning the Jihadist interpretation of Islam. Dawah and jihad, carried out by a vanguard, are also the appropriate means for rejection and renunciation.

5.2.2 Eindtijd

The Quran and the Tradition contain many views and images of the End Time. The procedure around the End Time is called 'the Hour' [*as-Sa'q*] in Islam. During the End Time, nature and the cosmos will 'rebel', followed by the destruction of the world. Then, a resurrection of mankind and nature will take place. The rebellion and resurrection are called '*al-qiyyama*' in Islam.

The Islamic doctrine on the End Time had passed into oblivion many centuries ago. Salafists, however, revived this element of Islamic dogmatics during the last three decades. Where Salafism emphasises the moral decline that precedes 'the Hour', Jihadism emphasises the different manifestations of fight, conflict,

and war in developing this element. It naturally follows from this that Jihadism holds the view that the armed fight continues until Judgment Day. Jihadists are charged with the duty to carry out the jihad until Judgment Day.

Jihadism uses the images of the End Time to describe the current political reality of Muslims and the actual world situation in a visionary way. This is done in terms of final confrontation between the powers of the faith and disbelief and good and evil. On the basis of this, it formulates political objectives regarding the liberation of Palestine and Iraq. In this connection we may consider the notions of Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri on repeated occasions about opening a gate for Palestine from the Levant.⁴ These images also play a role in the creative imagination of the 'destruction of America' and following from this the development of thoughts about spectacular terrorist actions with widespread deadly effects and the use of weapons of mass destruction. The vanguard, read Jihadists, is permitted to use all means required to perform its duty.

Jihadism considers the End Time worth striving for and wants to contribute to its rapid realisation. This also fits in well with the activist nature of Jihadism. This calls up all kinds of apocalyptic images, which could be a source of inspiration for designing terrorist attacks.

5.2.3 Worldwide rule of Islam

According to Jihadists, Islam is, for God, the only legitimate and acceptable faith. Islam is the salvation and redemption for mankind. For this reason, Islam will have to rule the world.

5.2.4 Re-establishment of the Islamic State

Jihadists strive for the re-establishment of Islamic State in accordance with their interpretation of the model of the religious community of the Prophet: the Caliphate. A detailed model of the Islamic State does not, however, exist. The word 'model' should therefore not be taken too strictly. The Caliphate must be established under the direction of *one* leader of the religious community. The Caliphate forms a theocratic system in which the divine laws and regulations in all domains of life are central, and in which there is a link between religion and politics. The Islamic State will be founded on a society that is ruled by Islamic norms and values. This means that there is a link between doctrine and life, that there is group cohesion and solidarity among believing Muslims. In this society, the Islamic institutions form the cement of society.

5.2.5 Dawah and jihad as means for the vanguard

According to Jihadists, the foregoing objectives can be achieved by the combined use of dawah and jihad. In this context, the vanguard, read Jihadists, play a crucial role that restores the model of the Prophet Muhammad. The dawah focuses on worldwide propagation of the pure and rightful faith and on encouraging the good and combating the evil. Hijra constitutes a link between dawah and jihad. Hijra makes it possible to build up the strength to wage an offensive jihad against unbelievers. Once sufficient strength has been built up, the switch to the armed fight is made. The armed fight constitutes the only logical and right-wing Islamic means to establish the (pure and rightful) faith and the Islamic State. Jihadists regard the armed fight as a divine assignment and consequently as a religious duty of each Muslim. Martyrdom is an ultimate form of worship of God.

⁴ *The Levant is the name for the area that currently covers Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel/Palestine.*

5.3 Characteristics of Jihadist ideology

5.3.1 *Jihadism is of an activist nature*

Jihadism is of an activist nature. The ideology is opposed to the present and is strongly focused on change. This change is a return to the days of the Prophet Muhammad and the four successors. Jihadism has stated goals, but these goals are, for the most part, negative: opposition against something. The abstract goals to which Jihadists commit themselves have hardly been developed, and have certainly not been translated into the form of a concrete political programme. Jihadists do not, for instance, express any views regarding socio-economic issues, such as poverty, distribution of income, and access to scarce items, nor have they developed sufficient views on an economic system or other economic issues. They reject, for instance, both the communist and capitalist systems, but they do not have any alternative. The strategy of jihad, and the dawah as a gate to the jihad, has been specified in more detail and more comprehensively. The ideals automatically follow more clearly from the fight.

5.3.2 *Jihadism is not a closed system*

Jihadism is not a closed system. Its ideology may be adjusted to other contexts and circumstances, and may be declared applicable to various contexts and circumstances. It is apparent from its historical context that Jihadism has constantly interacted with its environment and circumstances. As a result of this, the ideology has an opportunistic character. A strong point of Jihadism is its learning capacity, although this applies more to the strategy than to the ideology itself. Experiences are constantly assessed in terms of opportunities and failures. It should further be noted that the Jihadist ideology and strategy have been inspired by a large variety of - and even contradictory - intellectual traditions, such as the ideas of the Muslim Brothers and Marxist Leninism. The internal debates within Salafism and the Muslim Brothers have influenced the debates within Jihadism and vice versa. Jihadism is and consequently remains dynamic, with constant interactions with the circumstances in and the reality of its environment.

5.3.3 *Jihadism is not a monolithic system*

For the sake of order and the systematic description of the Jihadist ideology and strategy, the main focus in this discourse has been on the central concepts and doctrines. In the description, the emphasis has been on the common denominator. Within Jihadism, however, there is indeed a large substantive variety. This is reinforced by historical contexts and current affairs. An example of this is the distinction between the Egyptian and Saudi branches of Jihadism. Opinions about a sub-theme may also differ greatly within the same branch. This applies, for instance, to the discussion between al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi about the application of the concept of renunciation [Takfir]. Jihadism furthermore often uses complex concepts with strong religious meanings. The substance of these concepts may be interpreted differently or different consequences may be attached to those interpretations. An example of this is the concept of Tawheed. Although we speak of a Jihadist ideology and strategy, there are indeed differences of opinion. This can, for instance, be compared to communism, which contained a variety of positions on numerous issues.

5.3.4 *Robust character*

The Jihadist ideology is characterised by its high degree of robustness of the theological and dogmatic substantiation of political concepts and thoughts. The substantiation is based on a thorough study of the sources in the Quran and the Tradition and a strong interrelationship among the central concepts. The ideology is also robust due to the dualistic character of the theme, with the commitment to something going hand in hand with an opposition to something. The Jihadist ideology is made resistant to criticism, because it

identifies itself with the Quran and the Islamic faith. In this way, Jihadists try to present their ideology as sacred and infallible, and they reject every attempt at criticism as blasphemy or as an attack on Islam

The specific method of interpretation underlying the Jihadist ideology is another aspect of robustness and resistance to criticism. Jihadists turn relatively easy concepts in the Quran and the Tradition into complex concepts. They subsequently simplify them to simplistic clichés. An example of this is the concept of *[Hukm]*. This concept can be translated by judgment, regime, government, authority, prescription as well as court decision. In verse 40 of Sura 12 (Joseph) Arberry translated this concept as judgment: "...Judgment belongs only to God..."⁵ Jihadists interpret this element of the verse as follows: there is no other acceptable government or regime than the Divine one. On the one hand, this specific method of interpretation is a strong point of the ideology, but on the other hand, it is also a point of criticism. According to Jihadists, it is not permitted to interpret the Quran and the Tradition.

5.3.5 Romantic and mystical characteristics of Jihadism

Jihadism also has - to a certain degree - romantic characteristics. For the purpose of recruitment and selection, Jihadism calls up all kinds of moving 'romantic' feelings and images of reality by means of poetry, prose, and images of heroism from Islamic history. Many Jihadist leaders and fighters read and write classical Arabian lyrical poetry. Bin Laden's speeches, for instance, are filled with this type of poetry. Furthermore, Jihadists often use Arabian songs that glorify the jihad and martyrdom.

Jihadism also has mystical characteristics to a certain degree. Mysticism [*Tasawwuf*] may be described as a form of religious experience whereby a person seeks salvation in an inner experience, and eventually in an immediately intuitive experience of oneness with God. Mysticism is an important aspect of the Islamic culture. According to the Prophet Muhammad, mysticism is the great jihad. Salafists fully reject mysticism as a faith and as a practice. Jihadists also definitely reject mysticism as a practice of faith, insofar as the mystical views relate to contact with God. Salafists and Jihadists, however, are not opposed to certain behavioural aspects of mysticism, such as asceticism and selflessness for the sake of God.

The Islamic faith has a strong ascetic element and asceticism is also an important basis of belief in the Salafist doctrine. This certainly applies to the jihad. During the jihad, the jihad fighter practises a pious detachment and sincerity, and he practises submission to God, and as a result of this he follows in the footsteps of the Prophet. Both the jihad fighter and the 'mystic' [*Sufi*] seek a meeting with God. The mystic gives himself fully in a spiritual sense but without giving up his body, whereas the jihad fighter prepares himself to sacrifice his body. Both the mystic and the jihad fighter flee radically from the world and set themselves free from it, and as a result of this rise to a spiritual and emotional experience that is not experienced by others around them.

5.3.6 Other characteristics of Jihadism

The Jihadist ideology is based on a portrayal of man in which man is subservient to God in all respects. Man is ordered to obey God, to comply with his laws, and to respect his authority. Waging the jihad focuses on killing and death for the sake of God, and may assume various forms, such as the killing of

5 There may be differences between verse numbers due to different printed editions of the Quran (see appendix Verses from the Quran that explicitly refers to armed fight).

disloyal Muslims and unbelievers, but also martyrdom. In this sense, the life of man is only a means to realise God's will. Following from this, the lives of men - of both the jihad fighters and the victims of the jihad - are only instruments for achieving the higher goals of Islam.

Another characteristic is the intellectualistic character of the argument. This is evident, for instance, from the systematic references to sources and extremely far-reaching interpretations of comprehensive Islamic concepts, and the endeavour to achieve the greatest possible erudition. As a result of this, the Jihadist argument has acquired an abstract and theoretical character and is not easily accessible to outsiders. The side effect of the intellectualistic character of the argument is that Jihadists focus very strongly on texts. As a result of this, texts from different spiritual and political leaders are declared sacred. In this way, the Jihadist line of reasoning derives its strength from rational reasoning and references to reality more than it does from empirical facts.

Another essential characteristic is the exclusion of dissenters. Muslims of the same Sunnite conviction, for instance, are condemned for differing from Jihadism on minor details. This also applies to other branches within Islam, such as Shiism and Sufism. In addition, Jihadism, like Salafism, rejects the non-Hanbalitic schools of law. The exclusion and renunciation of these schools of thought eventually result in the inclination of Jihadists to eliminate the other groups even physically. This evokes feelings of aversion in these other groups, and results in a resistance against Jihadism. This decreases the support for Jihadism, and limits the possibilities of mobilisation and recruitment of Jihadists.

6 Jihadist Strategy

6.1 Jihadist strategy formation in historical perspective

From around 1986 onwards, during the period of the armed fight in Afghanistan against Soviet troops, the first contours of a Jihadist strategy became visible. This strategy continued to develop from then on. In particular, the first Gulf War, the attacks in the US, and the invasion in Iraq have been of great importance to the continued strategy formation. Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, strategic thinking has become increasingly dynamic. The trends that can be discerned in this strategy formation include a decrease in the theological value of the strategic analyses and insights, professionalisation, and militarisation.

6.2 View of international relationships and the image of the enemy

According to Jihadism, there is a continuous and permanent conflict between belief and disbelief, or between 'pure and rightful Muslims' and others. An offensive is in progress, a new crusade of Jews and Crusaders under the leadership of the US. Many Jihadist texts use the word combination of 'Jews and Crusaders' to replace the emotionally charged Marxist term of 'international imperialism'. The Jihadist movement characterises complex and unsolved political and territorial issues and conflicts as being religious issues. In this way, it joins in with the negative sentiments about these issues and conflicts, but it also contributes to them. Just like many other movements do, the Jihadist movement also claims international political incidents such as the crisis around the Danish cartoons and statements of the Pope as pretexts for its own purposes.

On the basis of right-wing Islamic basic principles, the Jihadists distinguish a variety of territories where the fight must be waged. They regard Muslim countries that were occupied by unbelievers in the past, or were recently occupied, or are still occupied by unbelievers as *occupied Muslim territory*. Examples of such countries are Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Chechnya. The armed fight in these countries is given preference to countries that have not been conquered, or have not yet been conquered, by Islam and Muslims. Jihadists regard *Muslim countries with disloyal regimes* as important territory where the armed fight must be waged, for combating disloyal Muslims is more important than combating unbelievers. These countries are also close enemies who are within reach.

Liberated territory is territory that consists of areas which are controlled wholly or in part by a specific Jihadist group of armed fighters and where the coalition and/or the current government no longer have full control. Think in this context of flash-points in Iraq, specific regions of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia or 'no go areas' in the Algerian mountains and desert. In these areas, the Jihadists can establish mini-caliphates, from where they can continue the 'conquest' of the rest of the country and its surrounding areas. *The territory of unbelievers* is also a scene of battle. Jihadists refer to this territory as the 'distant enemy'. According to Jihadists, the jihad is not restricted to a territory or a domain. Muslims will therefore have to combat the unbelievers in their own territory. According to some ideologists, it is even the duty of each Muslim, wherever in the world, to kill unbelievers all over the world.

6.3 Strategic notions regarding the re-establishment of the Islamic State

One of the ideals to which Jihadists commit themselves is the re-establishment of the Islamic State. This calls, however, for a short comment. As stated above, Jihadism is characterised by an activist attitude. Although the re-establishment of the Islamic State is an object within the Jihadist movement, it has not been specified in greater detail. The most important notion is that of returning to the early years of Islam. The Jihadist movement furthermore attaches more importance to the religious community,

as a kind of nation, than to the state or nation-state, which it explicitly rejects.

Jihadists strive for a theocratic political system and use the classical Islamic knowledge domain of the '*right-wing Islamic politics*' as basic principle. This knowledge domain aims at establishing a political system and national economy within the framework of Islamic Law. Jihadists have rehabilitated this knowledge domain. This 'rehabilitation' fits in with the goal of striving for a return to the religious community of the Prophet Muhammad and his successors. The proclamation of Islamic states or emirates, small or large, fits in this context. In the days of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in the period 1996 up to and including 2001, the Taliban proclaimed an Islamic emirate. In the autumn of 2006, Jihadists announced the establishment of an 'Islamic State of Iraq'. The self-proclaimed 'Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus' (2007) is also based on Islamic Law (Sharia) and is also a theocracy. The Jihadists have meanwhile also referred to an 'Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan', either restored or continued. It is quite possible that they intend to do the same with the Palestinian areas and the Maghreb in the long term.

Jihadists eventually want one leader of believers. Jihadist literature currently refer to two different kinds of leaders, namely the leaders of the armed fight, either locally and regionally or worldwide, and the leaders, to be appointed by Jihadists, of the Islamic states in Afghanistan, the Caucasus, and Iraq. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are regarded as leaders of the worldwide armed fight, but also as the leaders of the religious community. The issue of leadership is currently insufficiently crystallised.

Islamic institutions are essential to the Jihadist movement. The institutions do not only possess a set of norms and values, but they also pass them down. Jihadists advocate the restoration of the classical institutions of Islam, such as the mosque, the consultative bodies for the Shura, and the vice squad for 'accountability' [Hisba]. As Jihadists fiercely oppose the existing institutions, such as the religious and training institutions, they are inclined to set up their own institutions. This particularly applies to training and spiritual education institutions, but also to the media.

In principle, Muslims must distance themselves from institutions which the Jihadist regard as not being based on an Islamic identity and basic principle. As there are not any 'proper' Islamic institutions yet, Muslims are permitted to make pragmatic choices insofar as these institutions are not contrary to their faith. In very special cases, Muslims are permitted not to distance themselves of institutions that are fully contrary to the Islamic identity. They may conceal their own faith for fear of reprisals, oppression, or persecution [*Taqiyya*]. This *Taqiyya* constitutes, for instance, the basic principle for the infiltration of Jihadists in security services and the army.

According to Jihadists, the ideal Islamic society must be organised as 'prescribed' by the revelations in the Quran, described in the Tradition, and in accordance with Islamic Law. The Islamic society is regarded as subordinate to higher religious and political goals. This explains why Jihadists have not developed a social and economic doctrine and strategy, and why they do not have any ready-made solutions to social and economic problems.

6.4 Strategy of the dawah

The preparations for using violence are an essential part of the peaceful strategies of Jihadists in the form of dawah. Instruments of dawah are spiritual, cultural, and religious preparations just as spiritual

education, training, and political preparations. Jihadists consider the creation of political support for the armed fight among the Muslim masses to be crucially important, just as the use of the media. The political actions are flanked by violent actions.

6.5 Strategy of the jihad (violent strategy)

An important shift in strategic thinking after 11 September 2001 is the large emphasis on waging war and even the thought of building an Islamic army. This thought is, for instance, new in respect of previous insights which held that the, in essence political, vanguard would take up arms and bring about the revolution or start urban guerrillas.

Jihadists consider the fight at an 'open front', with direct military confrontations, the highest strategic form of the jihad, because this is a method by which a territory can be conquered. The Jihadist movement depends, however, on other conflict strategies, because the enemy have military dominance. It is more likely that Jihadist use instruments such as guerrilla war or terrorism. An important principle of these instruments is that of exhausting the enemy.

There are different views of the question regarding the scale on which the fight must be waged. It is possible to distinguish the following three variants in this connection: a primarily local orientation, namely towards the fight against disloyal regimes in one's own country (close enemy); an orientation towards the distant enemy, the US and its allies; or even globally, against all unbelievers. As a result of the armed fight in Iraq, more prominent people have adopted an international orientation, and Jihadists have proceeded from a mixed approach, in which the local actions are supposed to support the global actions and vice versa. Jihadists focus on more than one enemy at the same time and realise that the destruction of an enemy takes time. Jihadists consider the formation of Islamic mini-states (see section 6.3) an important step in the direction of the Caliphate.

It is also possible to distinguish different views of the methods of waging the fight. It is al-Qaeda's intention to build up an Islamic army in the long term. The Jihadist strategist Abu Musab as-Suri has developed a model for organised resistance brigades as a form of jihad without central leaders. There are also supporters of a more anarchistic course, in the form of an armed fight without leader and hierarchic organisation that could create chaos. Finally, some Jihadists within the Jihadist movement are of the opinion that the armed fight should be fought individually. This is called 'individual terrorism' and stands for violent activities carried out by one person or by a small cell.

The jihad fighters must be prepared for the armed fight. The preparation is primarily of a religious, psychological and moral nature, in addition to physical training. This spiritual preparation includes initiating the Jihadists into the doctrinal aspects of the jihad. Jihadism uses various Islamic religious views (accountability for good deeds), perceptions (life and death), attitudes (asceticism and selflessness), and values (martyrdom) as mechanisms to increase the preparedness of the jihad fighter to self-sacrifice and to decrease or even eliminate the mental and psychological resistance against violent death. The potential martyr is initially confronted with ordinary death by being continually reminded of death. In this way, the threshold to 'ordinary' death is lowered. The potential martyr is subsequently confronted with violent death. Martyrdom is praised. The preparations of the jihad fighter for martyrdom have many features of a mystic experience. The jihad fighters must also be physically prepared for the armed fight in the form of

training. At the technical military level, the Jihadist groups of fighters derive their views and methods from universal and current modern military techniques.

The method by which the Prophet Muhammad and the four Caliphs established the original religious community is an important source of inspiration for Jihadists. According to Jihadists, the divine plan of the Prophet to propagate Islam was implemented on a phased basis. There are various interpretations of that method. According to one of those interpretations, the Prophet Muhammad developed a plan on the basis of a divine instruction to wage the jihad against unbelievers. It started with the consolidation of the basis from the revelation in 610 up to and including the establishment of the Islamic State in Medina in 622 (13 years according to Jihadists). As soon as the structure of the state in Medina had been formed, the armed fight against the unbelievers started (10 years according to Jihadists). According to Jihadists, the structuring of the community and the propagation of Islam lasted 23 years. Jihadists use this scheme as a guideline for realising their ideal.

The deliberations about the strategy to wage the armed fight and realise the ideal in the end was given concrete form in a step-by-step plan for the medium term. This step-by-step plan was drafted in 2006 by an anonymous author, presumably a key member of al-Qaeda. This step-by-step plan is quoted in Jihadist and Western literature as an important document. The steps of this plan are described below.

1. Preparations for the jihad (2000 - 2003)

The first confrontation between al-Qaeda and the Jihadist movement took place in the US with the attacks of 11 September 2001. This start of the process was continued by the invasion in Afghanistan and the occupation of Iraq. In this period, the US devoted itself all over the world to a broad confrontation with the Jihadist movement. Once again, the Americans became targets all over the world. The message of the Jihadist movement reached Muslims everywhere and the Jihadist networks spread and succeeded in gaining a foothold in various countries.

2. Start of the jihad (2003 - 2006)

This phase started with the occupation of Iraq in April 2003 and ended at the end of 2006. The religious community became aware of the conspiracy of the enemy, the US and the disloyal regimes. Due to its scope and proliferation, the Jihadist movement developed into an invincible organisation that continued to increase. In this period, the first confrontation with Israel occurred and actions were targeted at the oil installations and oil stocks. The preparations for the attacks took place through the Internet. Iraq remained a base for the training and education of fighters. This period also produced new initiatives to tap new financial sources from the religious community. The purpose of fundraising was to buy weapons.

3. Intensification and concentration of the jihad (2007 - 2010)

In this period, a strong Jihadist movement will be built up from within and around Iraq. Fighters from the countries surrounding Iraq are preparing themselves for a full-blown confrontation with Israel. Actions are carried out on the borders of Israel and in the country itself. This period also sees the formation of a legitimate leadership for the religious community. The Jihadist movement is developing further in respect of 'human resources' and financing. Jews outside Israel, and in particular in Turkey, are losing their influence over the Turkish economy and army as a result of specific actions. Turkey is becoming an important centre for the development of the jihad.

4. Destabilisation of disloyal regimes (2010 - 2013)

Slowly but surely, the disloyal regimes in Muslim countries will grow weaker. The US will get exhausted due to the increasing confrontation with the Jihadist movement. As a result of this, they will come to help these regimes less frequently. This will lead to the collapse of the regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and Pakistan. Any losses as the result of attacks on oil installations and oil stocks will hit the American and world economy in the heart, with all its consequences for regimes in Muslim countries that have built up their economy and income on oil, such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. In this period, the US will be confronted with virtual attacks on its economy. Due to its increased weakening, the US will no longer be able to provide sufficient support to Israel.

5. Establishment of the Islamic State/states (2013 - 2016)

In the period from the end of 2013 to the end of 2016, the West will slowly but surely lose its hold on Muslim countries. The deterring power of Israel will diminish; the British will move away from the rest of Europe and choose to defend their own historically established interests in the world. The disloyal regimes that collapsed in the previous period will be replaced by federal states, based on the divine laws and regulations. These states will not be uniform in respect of structure and organisation and they will be rearranged into a unity in the context of global weakening of Western powers. The Caliphate will be proclaimed in Muslim countries. This state will work on the reconstruction of the Muslim world and will establish a new balance of power with the West.

6. Global confrontation (2016 - 2020)

From 2016 onwards, the Caliphate will offer resistance to the powers of disbelief. The object will be to destroy the powers of disbelief. The Caliphate will focus on the liberation of various Muslim countries, such as Palestine, Kashmir, and Andalusia. A global confrontation will consequently take place. The conflict will soon end and result in a victory for Muslims.

7. Final victory

The Caliphate will be restored permanently and established globally. It will bring victory to Muslims. The Caliphate will continue to work on the realisation of the envisaged objectives of the worldwide religious community and universal propagation of Islam. In this period, various omens of the End Time will become visible.

6.6 Muslims in the West

Among Jihadists there seems to be no consensus about the position and role of the Muslims in the West. In principle, Muslims are not permitted to migrate to and settle in Western countries. Al-Zawahiri appears to have adopted a pragmatic position. He considers Muslims in the West an essential part of the worldwide religious community who can perform tasks in both the dawah and the jihad. As-Suri, however, is of the opinion that Muslims should leave the country of disbelief for Muslim countries. Only in very exceptional circumstances are Muslims permitted to reside in the West. Firstly, this relates to political refugees who cannot propagate their Islamic views in their countries. Secondly, this relates to Muslims who serve the jihad, for instance, in the form of espionage or making preparations for and carrying out attacks.

7 Method of Production, Reproduction, and Propagation

7.1 Producers of Jihadist ideology and strategy

The Jihadist concepts, theoretical insights, views, and ideas are produced by various leaders. We can distinguish the following three categories of leaders. First of all, there are the spokesmen of the core of al-Qaeda, mainly Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Secondly, there are the leaders of the 'Islamic states' in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Caucasus. Thirdly, there are the local or regional leaders of various Jihadist groups.

Around the turn of the century, spiritual scholars [*Alim, plural: Ulama*] came forward who publicly stood up for the jihad. A separate category is formed by the 'students of knowledge' [*Tullab al-Ilm*]. This category is formed of mostly young people who become proficient in religious studies under the guidance of an authoritative Sheikh outside regular education in informal circles in and outside the mosques. This figure of 'student of knowledge' is only seen in Salafist and Jihadist circles. During the past few years, their unauthorised nature has caused religious anarchy in many Muslim countries. As a result of this, unqualified persons started to preach the Jihadist ideology, on the pretext of propagating the faith.

The 'preachers' or 'Callers to Islam' [*Du'aat*] are missionaries who preach the pure and rightful faith. The Jihadist preachers contribute to passing down the Islamic faith through Jihadist glasses. They form an indispensable link between the great Sheikhs and the broad public that is to be mobilised.

The Jihadist ideology is being developed, and will be developed further, by 'strategists and analysts'. These are persons who produce views and evaluations on the continuation of the jihad. From time to time, the names or pseudonyms of authoritative analysts who give expression to the course of al-Qaeda and the Jihadist movement turn up in various Jihadist forums.

The translators form an essential link between the often Arabian producers and the members of the second and third generation of Muslim young people in the West. This translation work is often done by individuals on a voluntary basis.

Jihad fighters are part of the vanguard. They consequently play an essential role in the Jihadist movement and also participate in reproducing and propagating the Jihadist ideology and strategy. Manifestations of this are the 'stories of Arabian fighters' and the texts of individual jihad fighters who died as martyrs. These stories, which are taken from real life, appear to be intended primarily as an aid in the recruitment of new fighters.

7.2 Institutions of the Jihadist movement

An essential part of each Jihadist group is the 'Judicial Islamic Body'. This body performs an advisory and testing role towards the leaders regarding the determination of the course, the planning, and the performance of jihad actions on the basis of Islamic dogmatic teachings and Islamic Law. Several Jihadist organisations also have their own media commissions to issue publications.

For the purpose of producing and distributing publications, video and audio recordings, the Jihadist movement has set up virtual institutions. These function as information, media, and knowledge centres, think tank, or virtual library.

7.3 Methods of reproduction and propagation

For the purpose of production, reproduction, and propagation, the Jihadist movement uses large numbers of websites, web forums, and websites, and even virtual TV stations. At least three virtual media organisations play a crucial role in propagating the Jihadist message and propaganda by numerous Jihadist groups. The organisations involved are 'Al-Fajr', 'Global Islamic Media Front' (GIMF), and 'As-Sahab'. In addition to propagation through the Internet, propagation is also effected through the regular media and mosques. The Jihadist movement furthermore developed a clever educational and training programme. In addition, the Jihadist movement is good at propaganda, and it is also quick in reacting to criticism.

8 Conclusions and Final Observations

8.1 Conclusions

The conclusions of this study are the following:

1. Jihad in Islam is a concept with a peaceful and spiritual meaning as well as a violent meaning; which allows more than one interpretation, and which has been developed in numerous ways which have - in part - come about in a variety of situations. A single religiously authorised view on the concept is lacking.
2. Jihadism stems from the need for social and political change in Muslim countries, and from the attack on Islam and (former) Islamic territory as perceived by Jihadists. Jihadism arose primarily after 1979 in and as a result of various scenes of war, and has since then spread all over the world.
3. Sayyid Qutb's Salafist doctrines and ideas constitute the foundations of present-day Jihadist ideology and strategy. Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Abdullah Azzam, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Musab as-Suri, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, and Osama Bin Laden have also had a prominent influence on or role in its development. They declared that the armed fight, or war, (jihad) was lawful in an increasing number of circumstances, for more and more goals, and against an increasing number of opponents, and elevated the armed fight, or war, to the status of an individual duty for each Muslim.
4. Within Jihadism, the concept of jihad has become a byword for armed fight, also referred to as 'holy war'. Jihadists themselves also regard war, a guerrilla war, terrorism, and sometimes also individual unrelated criminal actions as the armed fight
5. The ultimate goal of Jihadists is the End Time, which is preceded by the worldwide rule of Islam and the re-establishment of the Islamic State. The jihad is the only and appropriate means to achieve the goals, just as the dawah and Hijra¹ in preparation for and in the context of the jihad. The concept of jihad as a means, and that which Jihadists oppose, have been developed much more than the goals
6. The concepts and theoretical notions of the Jihadist ideology have been developed on numerous points and made operational in strategic concepts and notions, particularly in respect of jihad as a means and that which Jihadists oppose. These concepts and notions are constantly adapted to new circumstances. In particular, the perceived attack on Islam and the 'Islamic territory' by 'Jews and Crusaders' is an essential theme.
7. The Jihadist ideology and strategy are produced, reproduced, and propagated by various producers, through various institutions and in a variety of manners.

8.2 Final Observations

As a result of the complexity of the phenomenon of Jihadism it is also a complex matter to find solutions to combat it. Nobody can claim to have a monopoly on the interpretation of the jihad in the religion of Islam. Each interpretation, so also the interpretation of Jihadism, could be refuted by adherents of other branches in Islam. There are also controversies within the Jihadist movement itself, and there are controversies with other branches and variants of Islam. Refuting Jihadism or whatever interpretation of the concept of jihad requires much more than a superficial study of several verses of the Quran or the capability to refute several arguments.

¹ Hijra means migration from a country and flight to another country for religious or political reasons, but also a temporary or permanent settlement in the country to which Muslims have fled.

Jihadism has seized the Islamic faith to use for its own purposes, and claims to possess the absolute truth in this respect. Any changes in the basic principles of Salafism may have their bearing on Jihadism or narrow its basis. Saudi Arabia and (the pro-state variant) of Salafism are closely related and Saudi Arabia exports its ideas all over the world. Although Saudi Arabia maintains and exports an ideology that does not reject jihad in the meaning of the armed fight on the main issue, the country itself experiences much hinder from Jihadism. In addition, it is an ally of the West in countering terrorism. The possibilities of the current Saudi persons in authority to act are currently limited. The Saudi Arabian government, after all, derives its authority from Salafism and consequently does not have any interest in any changes in it. Renouncing Salafism would directly imply the implosion of the Saudi state. The first Gulf War clearly showed that the leeway of Saudi Arabia to go along with the West was quite restricted. Saudi Arabia consequently has little room to manoeuvre in respect of religious change, whereas it could actually play a key role in realising change.

Changes in the ideology of the Muslim Brothers may also have their bearing on Jihadism. The Muslim Brothers are at present expressly distancing themselves from the use of violence, and wish to realise their political goals along peaceful and political processes. They are obstructed in this by Jihadism. By distancing themselves from the use of violence, the Muslim Brothers function as a non-violent political group that could contribute to combating Jihadism. It is also a fact that they form a very powerful social movement in several Muslim countries, in particular in Egypt, and have broad public support. As a result of this, it is impossible to imagine democratisation processes without them. In spite of that, they do not receive much room to manoeuvre from the persons in authority, certainly in the case of Egypt. Egypt is an important ally to the West and it would not appreciate the West having intensive relationships with the Muslim Brothers. Although there is currently much discussion on numerous issues within the Muslim Brothers, their ideology is still imbued with antidemocratic and anti-Semitic ingredients.

Jihadism does not only present major religious, social, and political challenges to the West, but it also constitutes a threat. This threat is twofold. Firstly, Jihadism explicitly chooses the armed fight as a means to achieve ideals and to fight against everything they oppose. Their targets are not only governments, civil servants, or soldiers, but also civilians and economic and technological infrastructures. Secondly, Jihadism rejects and condemns all other political systems, and all religious, philosophical and political views that do not meet the idealised picture of Jihadism, just like the parties they consider enemies of Islam. These enemies must be fought. Following this line of reasoning, Jihadism rejects the basic premises of the Dutch democratic legal order and aims at ideals that are diametrically opposed to this legal order. The Jihadist, for instance, rejects and condemns the separation of powers and the freedom of religion. Jihadism explicitly also rejects the international legal order, for Jihadism strives for a worldwide rule of Islam and the re-establishment of the Islamic State, and rejects international organisations, rules of law, et cetera. As a result of the use of violence and the condemnation of the basic premises of the Dutch democratic and international legal order, Jihadism emanates a physical and existential threat.

The threat of Jihadism is not only directed at the West and non-Muslims, but also, perhaps even primarily, at Muslim countries and Muslims. Jihadists consider themselves, after all, the only pure and rightful Muslims. In the eyes of Jihadists, the vast majority of other Muslims are disloyal and the jihad may and must also be waged against them. In practice, it is evident that Muslims are the first to be affected

by Jihadism. The fight against Jihadism is therefore not a fight between the West and the Muslim countries or between Muslims and non-Muslims, but a joint fight of non-Jihadists against Jihadists.

On the basis of the fact that Islam and the Muslims do not form a single unified entity, certainly not when it is about such a complex concept as jihad, one may have doubts about the paradigm of the 'Clash of Civilisations', which is the basis of the current 'war against terrorism'. This paradigm may provide some explanation for cultural historical developments in Muslim countries, but it does not provide any excuse or context for changes and interventions with broad public backing. Besides, such a paradigm creates a distance between cultures and religions, and frustrates attempts at cooperation between non-Muslims and Muslims. It is exactly the inclination of non-Muslims to lapse into generalisations that could be grist for the mill of Jihadists. In addition, criticism of non-Muslims only makes internal criticism among Muslims more difficult, because this may encourage them to form a collective front.

In a number of Muslim countries, increasingly more voices are heard which express the thought that the appropriate counter-strategy against the political Islamic and Jihadist interpretation monopoly of the Quran can be found in another exegesis and a modern interpretation of the Quran.² This view is controversial in orthodox and fundamentalist Muslim circles, because the Quran is considered to be the word of God. In this respect, parallels can be drawn between the modernisation of the Christian faith from the sixteenth century and the current debates about the Quran exegesis in Muslim countries.

2 Examples of this are recent publications on a new Quran exegesis by the Moroccan philosopher and Islam expert M.A. El Jabri.

Appendices

GLOSSARY

Alim (plural Ulama): A clergyman, a person who is educated in Islamic religious knowledge on the basis of a recognised, education at one of the authoritative educational institutes of a Muslim country.

Al-Qaeda adherents: Networks, groups, cells, and individuals who are not in contact with the core of Al-Qaeda, but who feel inspired by the ideology of the core of Al-Qaeda or Al-Qaeda related ideology. In respect of the Dutch situation, these are mainly local networks that have their own local dynamics and to whom the other appearances of Al-Qaeda referred to are only a source of inspiration.

Al-Qaeda allies: Networks, groups, cells, and individuals who are in contact with the core of al-Qaeda, but are not operationally controlled by the core of Al-Qaeda. This may, for instance, apply to regional organisations who maintain contact with the core of Al-Qaeda, but who furthermore design and implement their own plans.

Caliph: Deputy, successor. The term 'Caliph' means successor of the Prophet Muhammad. A Caliph also refers to the political leader of the Islamic (unitary) state. This leader rules a larger state and a larger territory, the Caliphate.

Caliphate: The dominion of the Caliph or the Islamic (unitary) state.

Close enemy: By close enemies, Jihadists refer to regimes in Muslim countries which are (in their opinion) unbelieving/disloyal regimes

Core of Al-Qaeda: The 'former' Al-Qaeda organisation around Osama Bin Laden which still has its whereabouts in the Afghan-Pakistan region. It also includes networks, groups, cells, and individuals with their whereabouts elsewhere in the world, and which are under direct, operational control by Al-Qaeda's central leadership.

Dawah: Literally 'invitation' to Islam. Dawah in its more traditional meaning is an invitation to Muslims to comply with Islam and to convert unbelievers to Islam. It is a form of preaching and missionary work. In Jihadism, dawah is mainly used in the context of preparations for the jihad.

Defensive jihad [Jihad ad-Dafe]: An armed fight, or war, targeted at the protection of the religion, the religious community, the Islamic State, or the Islamic territory.

Distant enemy: By distant enemies, Jihadists mean the US and its allies. The distant enemy is also referred to as 'Jews and Crusaders'.

Emir: A political leader who promotes the interests of Muslims and defends the Islamic territory and the Islamic State. In Jihadist literature, this term is used for both the operational leader of a Jihadist group and for a head of state, for instance, in the case of the Emirate of Iraq.

Fatwa: A, usually legal, opinion of an Islamic scholar on a specific matter.

Hadith(s): The Hadith contains the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. These are thousands short and long narratives with examples of what the Prophet did, said, or approved. From the Hadith it may be concluded what the traditions or customs of the Prophet [*Sunnah*] were. In this study, the term that was mainly used to express this concept is 'Tradition' (see section 2.2).

Hakimiyya: The sovereignty of God (see section 4.3).

Hijra: The migration of Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in the year 622. This migration from Mecca to Medina is the beginning of the Islamic era. Hijra means migration from a country or withdrawal for religious and political reasons, but also a temporary or permanent settlement in the country to which Muslims have fled.

House of Islam [Dar al-Islam]: The territory ruled by the law and authority of Islam.

House of Treaty [Dar al-'Ahd]: The countries that had not yet / have not yet been brought under submission to the moral and political rule of Islam and with which countries a treaty has been concluded.

House of War [Dar al-Harb]: The countries that had not yet / have not yet been brought under submission to the moral and political rule of Islam. The 'house of war' is sometimes also referred to as the 'house of disbelief' [*Dar al-Kufr*].

Ideology: A set of perceptions, views, and ideas that is the underlying motive for the acts of a group of sympathisers for structuring society.

An ideology is a common and often normative reference framework for (a) the interpretation of the history and society in which one lives; (b) the world view one advocates (the ideal); (c) regulation of interrelationships of sympathisers on the one hand and dissidents on the other hand; and (d) the acts that may or must result in the ideal.

Imam: A spiritual leader whose responsibility it is to protect the faith. In everyday life, the concept of Imam refers to one who leads the congregation of believers in prayer.

Islamic territory (Jihadist meaning): The territory where Islamic law and order rule or have ever ruled.

Jahiliyya: This is a term referring to the pre-Islamic period (the time before the Prophet Muhammad) which, according to Islam, is characterised by unbelief, ignorance, and amorality.

Jihad: The basic meaning in the Quran is 'a struggle for a worthy cause'. Its first meaning is ethical: human beings have the divinely ordained duty to struggle against the evil in oneself. The second meaning is the struggle in the interest of Islam and the religious community. A third meaning is that of an armed fight, or war.

Jihadism: A movement within the political Islam striving - by means of an armed fight, or war (Jihad) - to bring about the worldwide rule of Islam and the re-establishment of the Islamic State (Caliphate), on the basis of a specific interpretation of the Salafist doctrine and on the basis of Sayyid Qutb's ideas.

Jihadists: Networks, groups, cells, and individuals striving - by means of an armed fight, or war (jihad) - to bring about the worldwide rule of Islam and the re-establishment of the Islamic State (Caliphate) on the basis of a specific interpretation of the Salafist doctrine and on the basis of Sayyid Qutb's ideas.

Jihadist movement: All the networks, groups, cells, and individuals striving - by means of an armed fight, or war (jihad) - to bring about the worldwide rule of Islam and the re-establishment of the Islamic State (Caliphate) on the basis of a specific interpretation of the Salafist doctrine and on the basis of Sayyid Qutb's ideas.

Jihadist terrorism: Terrorism from a Jihadist point of view. This category of terrorism is characterised by

- labelling as jihad the following acts: threatening with, preparing for, or committing acts of serious violence directed at people or other acts intended to cause property damage that could spark social disruption;
- performing activities that fit in with the endeavour to bring about a worldwide rule of Islam and the re-establishment of the Islamic State.

Land of the Two Sanctuaries: By Land of the Two Sanctuaries, Jihadists mean Saudi Arabia.

Levant: This is a name for the area of land that currently includes Syria, Lebanon, and Israel/Palestine. In the traditional Islamic and Arabian culture, this area of land is called 'Bilad ash-Sham'.

Muslim country: A country in which the majority of its population are Muslims. Jihadists consider a country a Muslim country when Islamic Law is applied under the leadership of a leader of believers.

Offensive jihad [Jihad at-Talab]: An armed fight or war with the aim of propagating Islam among unbelievers.

Right-wing Islamic politics: A traditional knowledge area aimed at the Islamic political system and national economy within the framework of Islamic Law.

Salafism: An ultra-orthodox Sunni Islamic movement that advocates a return to pure Islam as it was professed in the days of the Prophet Muhammad and by the four rightful caliphs during the subsequent first few centuries thereafter. The terms 'Salafism' or 'Salafist' literally mean pious, rightful predecessors. It is a puritan movement on the basis of a strict and literal interpretation of the Quran and the Tradition.

Sharia: Synonym for Islamic Law (see section 2.3).

Sheikh: Title used for spiritual scholars.

Shiites: The adherents of Ali Ibn Abi Talib, the fourth (and last) rightful caliph Ali (see section 2.1). The Shiites are of the opinion that the successor of the Prophet has/had to originate from the family of the Prophet Muhammad [*Ahl al-Bayt*], to start with his cousin and son-in-law Ali Ibn Abi Talib.¹

¹ H. Beck, *Islam in hoofdlijnen, Zoetermeer: Uitgeverij Meinema 2002, p. 46, J.L. Esposito, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, New York: Oxford university press, 2003, p. 292-293.*

Shirk: Major sin.

Sirah: Bibliography of the Prophet.

Strategy: The term political strategy mainly refers to the political objectives, course, and programme to realise society as it is advocated, for instance, by making statements about the envisaged form of government, economic structure, legal system, and such like. A military strategy is the coordinated, systematic development and deployment of military means of exercising power to achieve political objectives.

Sunnah: The Tradition or custom of the Prophet. In this study, the term Tradition was mostly used (see section 2.2).

Sunnite: The name is derived from the Sunnah, the Tradition or customs of the Prophet. It is true that the Sunnah is important to all Muslims, but Sunnis attach importance to the Sunnah and emphasize consensus of the religious community. The full name of Sunnites is 'people of the Sunnah and consensus' [*Ahl as-Sunnah wa'l-Jamā'ah*]. The Sunnites are of the opinion that the successor of the Prophet has/had to be designated or appointed. They do not think that the choice of a caliph is a matter of hereditary succession.²

Takfir: Literally denunciation. Both groups and individuals may be denounced - condemned as a heretic - when they are disbelieving or disloyal or belong to a different branch in Islam. Muslims who adopt a slightly different point of view may also be denounced.

Taqiyya: Concealing one's belief for fear of reprisals, suppression, or prosecution. This principle forms, for instance, the basis for infiltration of Jihadists in intelligence services and the army.

Terrorism (current definition until recently): Committing or threatening to commit violence directed at human lives or causing serious property damage with the aim of disrupting society, for the purpose of bringing about social changes or influencing political decision-making.

Terrorism (new definition): Terrorism is threatening to commit, making preparations for or perpetrating, for ideological reasons, acts of serious violence directed at people or other acts intended to cause property damage with the aim of disrupting society, for the purpose of bringing about social change, creating a climate of fear among the general public, or influencing political decision-making

Tradition: The term used in this study instead of Hadith and Sunnah meaning: in accordance with the Tradition/customs of the Prophet. The Tradition confirms the rules of the Quran, and gives depth to some rules and practical issues referred to in the Quran. In addition, it provides rules about issues that are not regulated in the Quran (see section 2.2).

² H. Beck, *Islam in hooflijnen*, Zoetermeer: Uitgeverij Meinema 2002, p. 46, J.L. Esposito, *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, New York: Oxford university press, 2003, p. 306-307.

VERSES FROM THE QURAN THAT EXPLICITLY REFER TO ARMED FIGHT

This appendix includes verses of the Quran that explicitly deal with the concept of jihad in the context of armed fight and that explicitly refer to the concepts of *[Qital]*, *[Harb]* or *[Ghazw]*. In this connection, the sequence of the Suras and verses is as follows. These Suras and verses are quoted literally from *The Koran Interpreted: A Translation* by A.J. Arberry.¹ The thematic allocation is based on an individual analytical division.

There may be differences between verse numbers due to different printed editions of the Quran. There are, for example, differences between the Dutch translation by Leemhuis (2005) as used for the Dutch version of our text and the English translation by Arberry (1996) as used for the English version of our text. The thematic allocation and explanation in this appendix is based on the Dutch translation by Leemhuis in combination with the Arabic verses in that translation.²

Sura	Verse	Verse text
2. The Cow <i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>	#149	And say not of those slain in God's way, 'They are dead'; rather they are living, but you are not aware. <i>Mobilisation: martyrdom</i> -
2. The Cow <i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>	#187	And fight in the way of God with those; who fight with you, but aggress not: God loves not the aggressors. <i>Motive: defensive / Ethics and rules</i> <i>This verse stipulates that it is absolutely not permitted to attack (wage an offensive war).</i>
2. The Cow <i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>	#188	And slay them wherever you come upon them, and expel them from where they expelled you; persecution is more grievous than slaying. But fight them not by the Holy Mosque until they should fight you there; then, if they fight you, slay them -- such is the recompense of unbelievers <i>Motive: defensive / Circumstances / Ethics and rules</i> <i>The unbelievers removed the believers from their homes. Muslims are allowed to react in proportion to this.</i>

¹ A.J. Arberry, *The Koran Interpreted: A Translation* by A.J. Arberry, New York, Simon & Schuster, First Touchstone Edition 1996.

² F. Leemhuis, *De Koran. Een weergave van de betekenis van de Arabische tekst in het Nederlands*, Houten: Fibula, 12e druk, 2005.

Sura	Verse	Verse text
2. The Cow <i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>	#188	-- but if they give over, surely God is All-forgiving, All-compassionate <i>Ethics and rules</i> <i>This verse may be considered as a basis for peace after waging a war.</i>
2. The Cow <i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>	#189	Fight them, till there is no persecution and the religion is God's; then if they give over, there shall be no enmity save for evildoers. <i>Motive: offensive war</i> <i>Offensive war with a view to propagate Islam</i>
2. The Cow <i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>	#213	They will question thee concerning the holy month, and fighting in it. Say: 'Fighting in it is a heinous thing, but to bar from God's way, and disbelief in Him, and the Holy Mosque, and to expel its people from it -- that is more heinous in God's sight; and persecution is more heinous than slaying.' They will not cease to fight with you, till they turn you from your religion, if they are able; and whosoever of you turns from his religion, and dies disbelieving -- their works have failed in this world and the next; those are the inhabitants of the Fire; therein they shall dwell forever <i>Circumstances / Against whom: unbelievers en dissenters</i> <i>The Arabic term that is translated by persecution means dissension or schism, by which dissenters [disloyal Muslims] are meant. The same is meant by the passage "whoever of you turns from his religion".</i>
2. The Cow <i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>	#245	So fight in God's way, and know that God is All-hearing, All-knowing. <i>Motive: defensive</i> -
3. The House of Imran <i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>	#151	If you are slain or die in God's way, forgiveness and mercy from God are a better thing than that you amass; <i>Mobilisation: martyrdom</i> -
3. The House of Imran <i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>	#152	surely if you die or are slain, it is unto God you shall be mustered. <i>Mobilisation: martyrdom</i> -
3. The House of Imran <i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>	#163	Count not those who were slain in God's way as dead, but rather living with their Lord, by Him provided, <i>Mobilisation: martyrdom</i> <i>This verse is often used in last wills of suicide bombers.</i>

Sura	Verse	Verse text
3. The House of Imran <i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>	#164	rejoicing in the bounty that God has given them, and joyful in those who remain behind and have not joined them, because no fear shall be on them, neither shall they sorrow, <i>Mobilisation: martyrdom</i> <i>This verse is often used in last wills of suicide bombers.</i>
3. The House of Imran <i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>	#165	joyful in blessing and bounty from God, and that God leaves not to waste the wage of the believers. <i>Mobilisation: martyrdom</i> <i>This verse is often used in last wills of suicide bombers.</i>
3. The House of Imran <i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>	#166	And those who answered God and the Messenger after the wound had smitten them -- to all those of them who did good and feared God, shall be a mighty wage; <i>Mobilisation: martyrdom</i> -
4. Women <i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>	#76	So let them fight in the way of God who sell the present life for the world to come; and whosoever fights in the way of God and is slain, or conquers, We shall bring him a mighty wage. <i>Mobilisation: martyrdom</i> -
4. Women <i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>	#77	How is it with you, that you do not fight in the way of God, and for the men, women, and children who, being abased, say, 'Our Lord, bring us forth from this city whose people are evildoers, and appoint to us a protector from Thee, and appoint to us from Thee a helper'? <i>Ethics and rules</i> <i>Calls to fight for the sake of the weak, including suppressed men, women, and children and for the sake of unjust treatment. This verse tells something about the religious backgrounds of the enemy to be fought.</i>
4. Women <i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>	#78	The believers fight in the way of God, and the unbelievers fight in the idols' way. Fight you therefore against the friends of Satan; surely the guile of Satan is ever feeble. <i>Motive: fight for God.</i> <i>This verse refers to the ideological basis of the fighting.</i>

Sura	Verse	Verse text
4. Women	#86	So do thou fight in the way of God; thou art charged only with thyself. And urge on the believers; haply God will restrain the unbelievers' might; God is stronger in might, more terrible in punishing.
Theme		<i>Mobilisation</i>
Explanation		-
4. Women	#91	They wish that you should disbelieve as they disbelieve, and then you would be equal; therefore take not to yourselves friends of them, until they emigrate in the way of God; then, if they turn their backs, take them, and slay them wherever you find them; take not to yourselves any one of them as friend or helper
Theme		<i>Against whom: unbelievers</i>
Explanation		<i>The essence of this verse is unconditional fighting against unbelievers and a ban on loyalty to and assistance from those unbelievers.</i>
4. Women	#92	except those that betake themselves to a people who are joined with you by a compact, or come to you with breasts constricted from fighting with you or fighting their people. Had God willed, He would have given them authority over you, and then certainly they would have fought you. If they withdraw from you, and do not fight you, and offer you peace, then God assigns not any way to you against them.
Theme		<i>Ethics and rules</i>
Explanation		<i>The essence of this verse relates to those with whom a treaty has been concluded.</i>
4. Women	#93	You will find others desiring to be secure from you, and secure from their people, yet whenever they are returned to temptation, they are overthrown in it. If they withdraw not from you, and offer you peace, and restrain their hands, take them, and slay them wherever you come on them; against them We have given you a clear authority.
Theme		<i>Circumstances</i>
Explanation		<i>Those refusing peace must be fought unconditionally.</i>
4. Women	#94	It belongs not to a believer to slay a believer, except it be by error. If any slays a believer by error, then let him set free a believing slave, and bloodwit is to be paid to his family unless they forgo it as a freewill offering. If he belong to a people at enmity with you and is a believer, let the slayer set free a believing slave. If he belong to a people joined with you by a compact, then bloodwit is to be paid to his family and the slayer shall set free a believing slave. But if he finds not the means, let him fast two successive months -- God's turning; God is All-knowing, All-wise.
Theme		<i>Ethics and rules: absolute ban on Muslims killing Muslims.</i>
Explanation		-

Sura	Verse	Verse text
4. Women	#98	Such believers as sit at home -- unless they have an injury -- are not the equals of those who struggle in the path of God with their possessions and their selves. God has preferred in rank those who struggle with their possessions and their selves over the ones who sit at home; yet to each God has promised the reward most fair; and God has preferred those who struggle over the ones who sit at home for the bounty of a mighty wage, in ranks standing before Him, forgiveness and mercy; surely God is All-forgiving, All-compassionate.
<i>Theme</i>		<i>Mobilisation: reward and punishment</i>
<i>Explanation</i>		-
8. The Spoils	#40	Fight them, till there is no persecution and the religion is God's entirely; then if they give over, surely God sees the things they do.
<i>Theme</i>		<i>Motive: offensive war</i>
<i>Explanation</i>		-
8. The Spoils	#61	Make ready for them whatever force and strings of horses you can, to terrify thereby the enemy of God and your enemy, and others besides them that you know not; God knows them. And whatsoever you expend in the way of God shall be repaid you in full; you will not be wronged.
<i>Theme</i>		<i>Mobilisation: incitement</i>
<i>Explanation</i>		<i>The essence of this verse is a fight against unbelievers. It is not possible to distinguish between defensive and offensive. Verse 61 is the slogan of Muslim brothers.</i>
8. The Spoils	#62	And if they incline to peace, do thou incline to it; and put thy trust in God; He is the All-hearing, the All-knowing.
<i>Theme</i>		<i>Ethics and rules</i>
<i>Explanation</i>		<i>Possibility to reach peace. The Muslim brothers do not use this verse in their slogan, although it immediately follows verse 61.</i>
8. The Spoils	#66	O Prophet, urge on the believers to fight. If there be twenty of you, patient men, they will overcome two hundred; if there be a hundred of you, they will overcome a thousand unbelievers, for they are a people who understand not.
<i>Theme</i>		<i>Mobilisation: incitement</i>
<i>Explanation</i>		-
9. Repentance	#5	Then, when the sacred months are drawn away, slay the idolaters wherever you find them, and take them, and confine them, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they repent, and perform the prayer, and pay the alms, then let them go their way; God is All-forgiving, All-compassionate.
<i>Theme</i>		<i>Motive: offensive war / Circumstances</i>
<i>Explanation</i>		<i>This verse is also referred to as the sword verse.</i>

Sura	Verse	Verse text
9. Repentance	#6	And if any of the idolaters seeks of thee protection, grant him protection till he hears the words of God; then do thou convey him to his place of security --that, because they are a people who do not know. <i>Against whom: idolaters / Circumstances</i>
<i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>		-
9. Repentance	#7	How should the idolaters have a covenant with God and His Messenger? -- excepting those with whom you made covenant at the Holy Mosque; so long as they go straight with you, do you go straight with them; surely God loves the godfearing. <i>Ethics and rules</i>
<i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>		-
9. Repentance	#12	But if they break their oaths after their covenant and thrust at your religion, then fight the leaders of unbelief; they have no sacred oaths; haply they will give over. <i>Ethics and rules</i>
<i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>		-
9. Repentance	#29	Fight those who believe not in God and the Last Day and do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden -- such men as practise not the religion of truth, being of those who have been given the Book -- until they pay the tribute out of hand and have been humbled. <i>Against whom: exclusion of Jews and Christians</i> <i>The phrase 'those who have been given the Book' refers to the Jews and Christians.</i>
<i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>		
9. Repentance	#36	The number of the months, with God, is twelve in the Book of God, the day that He created the heavens and the earth; four of them are sacred. That is the right religion. So wrong not each other during them. And fight the unbelievers totally even as they fight you totally and know that God is with the godfearing. <i>Motive: defensive / Circumstances</i>
<i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>		-
9. Repentance	#41	Go forth, light and heavy! Struggle in God's way with your possessions and your selves; that is better for you, did you know. <i>Mobilisation: incitement</i>
<i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>		-

Sura	Verse	Verse text
9. Repentance	#82	Those who were left behind rejoiced in tarrying behind the Messenger of God, and were averse to struggle with their possessions and their selves in the way of God. They said, 'Go not forth in the heat.' Say: 'Gehenna's fire is hotter, did they but understand. <i>Mobilisation: punishment of non-participation</i> <i>This verse is about those who do not participate in armed fight.</i>
<i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>		
9. Repentance	#83	Therefore let them laugh little, and weep much, in recompense for what they have been earning. <i>Mobilisation: punishment of non-participation</i> <i>This verse relates to those who do not wish to participate in the violent jihad, neither physically nor by financial and material contributions. They are held out the prospect of being punished severely in the hereafter.</i>
<i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>		
9. Repentance	#92	There is no fault in the weak and the sick and those who find nothing to expend, if they are true to God and to His Messenger. There is no way against the good-doers -- God is All-forgiving, All-compassionate. <i>Mobilisation: exemption</i> <i>This verse relates to those who have been exempt from participating in a war. The weak and sick believers of unbelievers who do not possess anything are exempt from participating personally in the violent jihad or making a financial or material contribution.</i>
<i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>		
9. Repentance	#112	God has bought from the believers their selves and their possessions against the gift of Paradise; they fight in the way of God; they kill, and are killed; that is a promise binding upon God in the Torah, and the Gospel, and the Koran; and who fulfils his covenant truer than God? So rejoice in the bargain you have made with Him; that is the mighty triumph! <i>Mobilisation: martyrdom</i> <i>-</i>
<i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>		
9. Repentance	#125	O believers, fight the unbelievers who are near to you; and let them find in you a harshness; and know that God is with the godfearing. <i>Motive: offensive</i> <i>This verse is aimed at unbelievers in the immediate vicinity.</i>
<i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>		
22. The Pilgrimage	#40	Leave is given to those who fight because they were wronged -- surely God is able to help them, <i>Motive for armed: defensive war</i> <i>First revelation of a war.</i>
<i>Theme</i> <i>Explanation</i>		

Sura	Verse	Verse text
47. Muhammad	#4 up to 7 inclusive	When you meet the unbelievers, smite their necks, then, when you have made wide slaughter among them, tie fast the bonds; then set them free, either by grace or ransom, till the war lays down its loads. So it shall be; and if God had willed, He would have avenged Himself upon them; but that He may try some of you by means of others. And those who are slain in the way of God, He will not send their works astray.
<i>Theme</i>		<i>Ethics and rules</i>
<i>Explanation</i>		<i>The fate of prisoners of war.</i>
48. Victory	#16	Say to the Bedouins who were left behind: 'You shall be called against a people possessed of great might' to fight them, or they surrender. If you obey, God will give you a goodly wage; but if you turn your backs, as you turned your backs before, He will chastise you with a painful chastisement.'
<i>Theme</i>		<i>Against whom: Bedouins, read polytheists</i>
<i>Explanation</i>		-
48. Victory	#17	There is no fault in the blind, and there is no fault in the lame, and there is no fault in the sick. And whosoever obeys God and His Messenger, He will admit him into gardens underneath which rivers flow; but whosoever turns his back, him He will chastise with a painful chastisement.
<i>Theme</i>		<i>Mobilisation: exemption</i>
<i>Explanation</i>		<i>This verse relates to Muslims who have been exempt from participating in a war.</i>
48. Victory	#20	God has promised you many spoils to take; these He has hastened to you, and has restrained the hands of men from you, and that it may be a sign to the believers, and to guide you on a straight path.
<i>Theme</i>		<i>Ethics and rules: spoils of war</i>
<i>Explanation</i>		<i>According to this verse, participation in a war produces an entitlement to spoils of war.</i>
61. The Ranks	#4	God loves those who fight in His way in ranks, as though they were a building well-compacted.
<i>Theme</i>		<i>Mobilisation: incitement</i>
<i>Explanation</i>		<i>The Arabic text explicitly uses the word [Qital] here.</i>

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The NCTb helps to make the Netherland a safer place to live

The task of the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism is to minimise the risk and fear of terrorist attacks in the Netherlands and to take prior measures to limit the potential of terrorist acts. The NCTb is responsible for the central coordination of counterterrorism efforts and ensures that cooperation between all the parties involved is and remains of a high standard.